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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL P. PIERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 990617-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah had jurisdiction in this matter in case No. 
990617-SC pursuant to Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1999), and §78-2-
2(3) (i), Utah Code Ann. (1997), whereby the defendant in a district court criminal action 
may take an appeal to the Supreme Court involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony. Appellant was convicted in Count I of Murder, a first-degree felony in 
violation of §76-5-203, Utah Code Ann. (1997), plus firearm enhancement, in Count II 
of Aggravated Burglary, a first-degree felony in violation of §76-6-203, Utah Code Ann. 
(1997), plus firearm enhancement, and in Count III of Aggravated Kidnaping, a first-
degree felony in violation of §76-5-302, Utah Code Ann. (1997), plus firearm 
enhancement. 
On September 27, 1999, jurisdiction was conferred upon this Court pursuant to 
§§78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3 (3) Q\ Utah Code Ann. (1998), when the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the court err in denying Mr. Pierson's Motion to dismiss Count II, 
Aggravated Burglary? U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, § 12; §§76-1-402(3), 
76-6-203(1 )(a), (b), Utah Code Ann. (1997); State v. Shaffer. 725 P. 2d 1301, 1313 
(Utah 1986). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Denial of a Motion to dismiss an included offense is 
a conclusion of law and fact. Conclusions of law are reviewed for "correctness". State 
v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). Conclusions of fact are reviewed under a 
"clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70, 87-88 (Utah 1993). 
Denial of a Motion to dismiss an offense for insufficiency of the evidence is 
reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 
1998). In reviewing a jury verdict, the appellate court views the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict. State v. 
Wood. 868 P.2d at 87-88. 
2. Did the court err in denying Mr. Pierson's Motion to dismiss Count III, 
Aggravated Kidnaping? U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, § 12; §§ 76-1-
402(3), 76-5-302(1 )(b), 76-6-203(1 )(a), (b), Utah Code Ann. (1997); State v. Finlavson. 
956 P.2d 283 (Utah App. 1998); see also State v. Finlavson. No. 980279 (Utah January 
14, 2000). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Denial of a Motion to dismiss an included offense is 
a conclusion of law and fact. Conclusions of law are reviewed for "correctness." State 
-2-
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v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). Conclusions of fact are reviewed under a 
"clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Wood. 868 P2.d at 87-88. 
Denial of a Motion to dismiss an offense for insufficiency of the evidence is 
reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Galli. 967 P2d 930, 933 (Utah 
1998). In reviewing a jury verdict, the appellate court views the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict. State v. 
Wood. 868 P2d at 87-88. 
3. Did the court err by failing to instruct the jury with the law barring conviction 
for included and merged offenses? U.S. Const, amends. V, VI; Utah Const, art. I § 12; 
§ 76-1-402(3), Utah Code Ann. (1998); State v. Rudolph. 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 
1998). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether to give a jury instruction is a conclusion of 
law that is reviewed for "correctness". State v. Parra. 972 P.2d 924, 927 (Utah App. 
1998). 
4. Did the court abuse its discretion by ordering Mr. Pierson to serve maximum 
consecutive sentences? U.S. Const, amends. V, VIII; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 9, 12: § 76-
3-401, Utah Code Ann. (1998); State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial of court abuses its discretion if it fails to 
consider all legally relevant factors or if the sentence imposed is clearly excessive. State 
v. McCovev. 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990). 
-3-
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PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The first issue on appeal, relating to Mr. Pierson's Motion to dismiss Count II, 
Aggravated Burglary, is preserved in the record ("R") at 123-31, 372-84,461 [25-26], 
and 469 [64-66]. 
The second issue on appeal, relating to Mr. Pierson's Motion to dismiss Count III, 
Aggravated Kidnaping, is preserved in the record at 123-31, 372-84, 461 [25-26], and 
469 [64-66]. 
The third issue on appeal, relating to the failure of the court to instruct the jury 
with § 76-1-402(3), Utah Code Ann. (1997), and the doctrine of merger is reviewable for 
the first time on appeal in order to avoid a manifest injustice. Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (1998); State v. Rudolph. 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998). A 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewable for the first time on appeal 
because Mr. Pierson is represented by new counsel and the trial court record is adequate 
to permit decision of the issues. State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37,40 (Utah 1996). 
The fourth issue on appeal, relating to the maximum consecutive sentencing of 
Mr. Pierson, is preserved in the record at 373 and 461 [23-25]. 
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rules and statutes will be determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1999) 
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence (1999) 
§ 76-1-401, Utah Code Ann. (1998) 
-4-
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§ 76-1-402, Utah Code Ann. (1997) 
§ 76-3-201, Utah Code Ann. (1998) 
§ 76-3-203, Utah Code Ann. (1997) 
§ 76-3-401, Utah Code Ann. (1998) 
§ 76-5-203, Utah Code Ann. (1997) 
§ 76-5-302, Utah Code Ann. (1997) 
§ 76-6-203, Utah Code Ann. (1997) 
The text of these rules and statutes is contained in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 22, 1998, Mr. Pierson, with codefendants Clint R. Hartley and Jeffery 
R. Burgener, was charged by Second Amended Information in Third District Court case 
No. 97100413FS. R: 18-22. Count I charged Criminal Homicide, Murder, a first-degree 
felony in violation of § 76-5-203, Utah Code Ann. (1997), Count II charged Aggravated 
Burglary, a first-degree felony in violation of § 76-6-203, Utah Code Ann. (1997), and 
Count IV charged Aggravated Kidnaping, a first-degree felony in violation of § 76-5-
302, Utah Code Ann. (1997). Count III charged Clint R. Hartley alone with Aggravated 
Kidnaping. All Counts were enhanced under § 76-3-203, Utah Code Ann. (1997) 
("firearm enhancement"), and under § 76-3-203.1, Utah Code Ann. (1997) ("gang 
enhancement"). Following the preliminary hearing, trial counsel moved the court to 
dismiss Count II, Aggravated Burglary, and Count III, Aggravated Kidnaping. R: 123-
31. The court denied the Motion on March 9, 1998, and ordered Mr. Pierson and the 
-5-
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codefendants bound over on all counts. R: 458[34]. 
On August 17, 1998, the court ordered that Mr. Pierson be tried separately. R: 
462[4]. Ajury trial began on August 25, 1998. R: 463. During the trial, codefendants 
Clint R. Hartely and Melisa Parker testified against Mr. Pierson as State witnesses. R: 
467[112-224]; 468[231-376]. After the State rested, trial counsel again moved to 
dismiss Counts II and III. The court took the Motions under advisement. R: 469[62-64]. 
Trial counsel failed to move the court to instruct the jury according to § 76-1-402(3), 
Utah Code Ann. (1997), that prohibits conviction of an offense that is included in a 
charged offense. Trial counsel also failed to request an Instruction based on the doctrine 
of merger that prohibits conviction for an offense that is merely incidental to a charged 
offense. The instructions provided to the jury appear in the Record at 295-343. The text 
of the Instructions is contained in Addendum C. On August 28, 1998, the jury convicted 
Mr. Pierson as charged on all three Counts. R: 466[212-13]. 
At the sentencing hearing on June 18, 1999, trial counsel again moved the court to 
dismiss Count II, Aggravated Burglary, and Count III, Aggravated Kidnapping. R: 372-
84. Trial counsel also moved the court to sentence Mr. Pierson concurrently. The court 
did not grant the Motion to dismiss Counts II and III. The court sentenced Mr. Pierson 
consecutively on all Counts, also ordering the maximum term of incarceration for 
Aggravated Kidnapping, fifteen years to life. R: 461 [45-46]. The court also imposed 
consecutive maximum enhancements on each Count under § 76-3-203, Utah Code Ann. 
(1997) ("firearm enhancement"). R: 461 [46]. The court did not impose enhancements 
-6-
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under § 76-3-203.1, Utah Code Ann. (1997) ("gang enhancement"). R: 461 [42-43]. The 
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment Order appears in the Record at 413-14; See also 
Addendum A. 
Mr. Pierson appeals from the final judgment, challenging the denial of his 
Motions to dismiss Counts II and III. Also, Mr. Pierson argues on appeal that the court 
erred by failing to instruct the jury with the law barring conviction for included and 
merged offenses. Finally, Mr. Pierson argues on appeal that the trial court abused its 
discretion by sentencing him to consecutive maximum terms of incarceration. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Testimony and evidence was presented at trial to support the following factual 
allegations. Codefendant Clint R. Hartley testified that on January 27, 1997, he, Michael 
Pierson and Jeffery R. Burgener met at Hartley's house. Pierson asked Hartley to 
participate in a plan to steal marijuana from a house at 6543 W. 3880 South. R: 468[235-
37]. Hartley agreed. Pierson described the floor plan of the house to Hartley and 
Burgener. Pierson told Hartley to enter the house, go upstairs and bring any person there 
downstairs. Pierson told Burgener to detain people on the floor in the living room. 
Pierson told them that Melisa Parker would knock on the door and ask for a fake name so 
the residents would open the door. When the door was opened, they would enter the 
house to look for the marijuana. R: 468[238]. Pierson said he would go to the basement, 
make sure nobody was there, and get the marijuana. R: 468[239]. Pierson said that the 
residents would give them what they wanted without fighting back. R: 468[248]. 
-7-
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Pierson said that if a person named Billy Charles was there and tried to fight back, he 
would shoot him. Otherwise, they took the guns only to scare the residents and control 
the situation. R: 468[249]. 
Burgener drove Pierson and Hartley in his car and picked up Melisa Parker at her 
house. R: 468[241]. Then they drove to Pierson's house. Pierson went inside and 
returned to the car with a white scarf he gave to Hartley to use as a mask, a red bandana 
he used as a mask, a nine-millimeter semiautomatic handgun, and a pair of socks that 
Pierson used as gloves. R: 468[243]. Then they drove to Burgener's house. Burgener 
went inside and returned to the car with white gloves and a .45 caliber revolver handgun 
he gave to Hartley, and brown gloves and a nine-millimeter semiautomatic handgun he 
kept for himself. R: 468[245]. 
Then they drove to the house in West Valley, with Pierson giving directions. R: 
468[246]. Burgener parked the car about two blocks away, and they walked to the 
house. They entered the driveway and went to the back yard where they put on masks. 
Burgener and Pierson looked through a window. The lights were on and they could hear 
female voices. R: 468[247]. Pierson, Hartley and Burgener had masks on and guns out. 
Parker had neither a mask nor a gun. R: 468[250]. Parker knocked on the side door and 
Pierson, Hartley and Burgener lined up at the sides of the door so as not to be seen when 
the door opened. R: 468[251-54]. When the door opened, Pierson and Hartley rushed 
through the door, with Hartley two feet behind and to the right of Pierson. R: 468[257]. 
Pierson fired his gun once into the house. Then Hartley fired once into the house. R: 
-8-
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468[258]. Donald Dobson was shot by Hartley. R: 340; 469[68]. The shooting of 
Dobson was not intentional. R: 326; 468[249]. 
Jared Bowers testified that on January 27, 1997, he, Elaina Hoggard, Casey 
Peterson, Neyna Davis and Donald Dobson were at the house at 6543 W. 3880 South in 
West Valley City. R: 463[115-17]. At about 7:30 p.m. he heard a knock on the side 
door of the house R: 463 [124]. He opened the door and saw a female whom he 
described as eighteen years old, five feet tall, blond hair and wearing Levis and a white 
sweater. R: 463 [126-27]. The female asked for a person named Nick. Before Bowers 
responded, a man appeared outside the doorway and pointed a pistol at his head. R: 
463[127-28]. The pistol was a semiautomatic design. R:463[129]. The gunman was 
wearing a black ball cap, a red bandana, black pants, black longsleeved shirt with a red 
and white jersey over it, and Bowers could not see his face or recognize him. R: 
463[130; 133]. Bowers grabbed the gunman's gun hand and pushed it away, and the gun 
discharged. R: 461 [131]. Bowers fell back, pushed the gunman away and then heard 
another shot. R: 463[132]. Bowers then ran out the door to a neighbor's house. R: 
463[136]. Bowers observed two other males in the carport as he ran away, both wearing 
bandanas over their faces. R: 463[135]. 
Elaina Hoggard testified that she, Jared Bowers, Neyna Davis, Don Dobson and 
Casey Peterson were present in the house a 6543 W. 3880 South on the evening of 
January 27, 1997. R: 463 [177-79]. She was sitting on the couch in the living room 
when she heard a knock on the side door. Peterson was upstairs in his bedroom and 
-9-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Davis was sitting on the couch. Bowers answered the door, and she heard a girl's voice. 
R: 463[180-81]. A male pushed his way through the door holding an automatic gun. She 
did not recognize the man because a bandana was covering his face. R: 463 [184]. The 
man was yelling to get down and was asking questions like "where is the shit." Bowers 
lifted up his hands and the man fired twice. Hoggard then turned and ran downstairs to 
the basement and entered the room on the left. R: 463[185]. From there Hoggard heard 
the footsteps of someone running upstairs from the living room and someone else 
running downstairs from the livingroom. R: 463 [187]. 
Hoggard testified that another male entered the basement room, put an automatic 
design gun in her face, and told her to get down on the ground. R: 463[188]. The lights 
were off downstairs. R: 463 [186]. The male repeatedly asked "where is the shit?" 
Hoggard remained there with the male no longer than five minutes. Then the first male 
Hoggard saw come through the door came downstairs with Neyna Davis in front of him. 
R: 463[191-92]. They entered the other downstairs bedroom and the male said "turn on 
the lights...don't open the door...don't even think about it...where is it at?". R: 463[193]. 
The male with Hoggard then ran out of the room and went upstairs. The other male 
brought Davis into the room, after less than a minute in the other bedroom, and told her 
to get on the ground with Hoggard. R: 463 [194]. Both males had automatic design 
guns. After about a minute, a third male in a checkered shirt entered the room and 
kicked over a table, saying "where is it?". R: 463 [195-96]. Then the male ran upstairs. 
Hoggard also testified that the males may have been downstairs only one at a time and 
-10-
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alone each time. R: 464[22]. 
Neyna Davis testified that she, Elaina Hoggard, Casey Peterson, Jared Bowers and 
Donald Dobson were in the house at 6443 W. 3880 South on the evening of January 27, 
1997. R: 464[54-55]. She heard a knock on the side door. Bowers answered the door 
and she heard a female voice. R: 464[58-59]. Bowers said "he's not here" and started to 
close the door when a male came in the door wearing a black and red checkered shirt, a 
red bandana on his face and a black hat. R: 464[60]. Davis saw two shots fired, then 
turned and saw Dobson lying on his back. R: 464[61-63]. Davis stood by Dobson and a 
different male put a gun to her head and told her to get down. R: 464[66-67]. The male 
was wearing a black and white jersey with a windbreaker, black pants, black beanie and a 
black rag around his mouth. R: 464[67]. The second male asked Davis "where the weed 
was". A girl entered the house and spoke with the male. Davis later identified her as 
Melisa Parker. R: 464[68-69]. The male directed Davis downstairs at gunpoint. They 
entered Jared's room downstairs and saw a rifle in the closet. The male said "don't think 
about touching that." R: 464[72-73]. They left that room after "a split second", then 
entered the room where Hoggard was with another male, not the one who entered the 
door first and fired the shot. R: 464[77-78]. They were in this room for maybe less than 
a minute. Davis then opened another storage room where marijuana might be, and then 
the male with Davis ran upstairs and left. R: 464[78-79]. The male Davis saw with 
Hoggard in the other room had already left. Davis saw Hoggard crouched on the floor by 
herself. R: 464[79-80]. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First, the trial court erred in failing to dismiss Count II of the Information, 
Aggravated Burglary, pursuant to the provisions of § 76-l-402(3)(a), Utah Code Ann. 
(1998), because Aggravated Burglary was proven in the present case by less than all the 
facts required to establish the commission of "felony murder" of which Mr. Pierson was 
convicted in Count I. U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, § 12; State v. Hill 674 
P.2d 96 (Utah 1993). 
Second, the trial court erred in failing to dismiss Count III of the Information, 
Aggravated Kidnaping, pursuant to the provisions of § 76-l-402(3)(a), because the facts 
proven at trial show that the detention was merely incidental to the commission of 
Aggravated Burglary. State v. Finlavson. 956 P.2d 283, 290 (Utah App. 1998). Further, 
under the doctrine of "merger", the evidence in the present case cannot support 
conviction of Aggravated Kidnaping even if it does not constitute a lesser included 
offense under § 76-3-402(3)(a) because the detention is incidental to the burglary. State 
v. Finlavson, No. 980279, slip. op. at 9 (Utah January 14, 2000). U.S. Const, amend. V; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12. 
Third, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that a defendant may not 
be convicted of an offense included in another charged offense under § 76-3-402(3). 
Similarly, the trial Court erred in failing to instruct the jury that a defendant may not be 
convicted of an offense that "merges" into another charged offense. The trial court erred 
in giving Instruction No. 23 because it contradicts § 76-3-402(3) and the doctrine of 
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merger. These errors create manifest injustice at trial. See Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (1998); State v. Rudolph. 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998). 
Further, trial counsel was ineffective by failing to try to cure these errors. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
Fourth, the sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing maximum 
consecutive sentences. U.S. Const, amends. V, VIII; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 9, 12; State v. 
Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993). The court failed to consider legally relevant 
factors in mitigation, relied on aggravating circumstances based on erroneous factual 
findings and failed to make necessary factual findings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS COUNT II, 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY. 
The "double jeopardy" clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides that no "person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb." Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides that no 
"person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Section 76-1-402(3), Utah Code 
Ann. (1998), is founded on these constitutional guarantees: 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode - Included 
offenses. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
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(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
In State v. Hill 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court of Utah adopted 
a two-part test to determine whether a greater-lesser relationship exists between two 
offenses: 
We conclude that for purposes of the prohibition against conviction "of both 
the offense charged and the included offense," § 76-1-402(3), the greater-lesser 
relationship must be determined by comparing the statutory elements of the two 
crimes as a theoretical matter and, where necessary, by reference to the facts 
proved at trial 
The secondary test is required by the circumstance that some crimes have 
multiple variations, so that a greater-lesser relationship exists between some 
variations of these crimes, but not between others... A theoretical comparison of 
the statutory elements of two crimes having multiple variations will be 
insufficient. In order to determine whether a defendant can be convicted and 
punished for two different crimes committed in connection with a single criminal 
episode, the court must consider the evidence to determine whether the greater-
lesser relationship exists between the specific variations of the crimes actually 
proved at trial 
(Citations omitted). See also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) 
("where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory 
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one. 
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not"). According 
to Hill therefore, we compare the statutory elements of the crimes charged in the present 
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case. 
The jury was instructed by Instruction No. 24 that the following statutory elements 
must be proven to find Mr. Pierson guilty of Criminal Homicide, Murder, in Count I: 
1. That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah; 
2. The defendant, Michael Paul Pierson, as a party to the offense; 
3. Was engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate 
flight from the commission or attempted commission of aggravated burglary; and 
4. Unlawfully caused the death of Donald Dobson. 
R: 325; See also Instruction No. 1 (R: 295). The jury was instructed by Instruction No. 
27 that the following statutory elements must be proven to find Mr. Pierson guilty of 
Aggravated Burglary in Count II: 
1. That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the defendant, Michael Paul Pierson, entered or remained in the 
building of Jared Bowers; and 
2. That the defendant entered or remained unlawfully; and 
3. That the defendant entered or remained intentionally or knowingly; and 
4. That the defendant entered or remained with the intent to commit a 
theft; and 
5. That in attempting, committing or fleeing from a burglary, the defendant 
or another participant in the crime either: 
(a) caused bodily injury to any person who was not a participant in 
the crime; or 
(b) used or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous weapon 
against any person who is not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possessed or attempted to use any explosive or dangerous 
weapon. 
R: 328 (emphasis added).1 
1. The jury was instructed as follows in Instruction No. 1: 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a First Degree Felony, at 6543 West 3880 
South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about January 27, 1997, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
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A. Aggravated Burglary Is An Included Offense Of Murder. 
As charged in the present case, Aggravated Burglary is an included offense of 
Murder according to the provisions of § 76-1-402(3)(a) because no additional facts or 
separate elements are required to prove Aggravated Burglary after "felony murder" is 
proven based on the commission of Aggravated Burglary. In State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 
1301, 1313 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court of Utah relied on the analysis set forth in 
Hill and held: 
Under the facts of this case, therefore, proof of aggravated robbery was a 
necessary element to proof of first degree felony murder. There can be no doubt 
that, standing alone, the crimes of aggravated robbery and first degree murder are 
separate offenses. The offenses are found in different sections of the code. First 
degree murder is an offense against the person, whereas aggravated robbery is an 
offense against property. However, under the test for separateness found in 
section 76-1-402(3), aggravated robbery becomes a lesser included offense of first 
degree felony murder where, in the situation such as the case at bar, the predicate 
felony for first degree murder is aggravated robbery. No additional facts or 
separate elements are required to prove aggravated robbery after first degree 
murder based on the predicate offense of aggravated robbery is shown. Thus, first 
degree murder based on the predicate offense of aggravated robbery stands in a 
greater relationship to the lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. If the 
FN. 1 (CONTINUED) 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL PAUL PIERSON, a party to the 
offense, entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling of Donald Dobson with 
the intent to commit a felony, and caused bodily injury to Donald Dobson and / or 
entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling of Donald Dobson with the intent 
to commit a felony, and used a dangerous weapon, to wit: handgun, against 
Donald Dobson. 
R: 296 (emphasis added). Instruction No. 27 alleges "in the building of Jared Bowers", 
but Instruction No. 1 alleges "in the dwelling of Donald Dobson." The Second Amended 
Information also alleges "in the dwelling of Donald Dobson" in Count II, Aggravated 
Burglary. R: 19. Instruction No. 27 is clearly erroneous in this respect. 
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greater crime is proven, then the lesser crime merges into it. Consequently, 
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-1-402(3) prevents the defendant from being convicted and 
sentenced for aggravated robbery in addition to first degree murder where the 
aggravating circumstance is aggravated robbery. 
This analysis should be controlling in the present case. 
The State argued below that Aggravated Burglary is not a lesser included offense 
of felony murder, relying on the analysis set forth in State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234 
(Utah 1990). In 1988 Charles McCovey was charged with capital first degree murder 
under § 76-5-202(I)(d), Utah Code Ann. (1988), and with Aggravated Robbery after he 
shot and killed a customer during the robbery of a store. The jury convicted McCovey of 
second degree murder under § 76-5-203(I)(d), Utah Code Ann. (1988) ("felony 
murder"), and Aggravated Robbery. 
The McCovey court held that Aggravated Robbery was not a lesser included 
offense on the facts of that case. The court applied the Hill test and then distinguished 
the holding in Shaffer as follows: 
Despite the fact that there are many functional similarities between the first 
degree murder aggravating factors and the second degree felony murder 
enhancements, there are some stark differences between the Shaffer case and the 
present case. First, in Shaffer, the victim of the robbery and the victim of the 
murder were the same person. In the present case, the video store was robbed, and 
a customer was killed. This distinction sets out in base relief the distinct 
differences in the nature of aggravated robbery and felony murder because there 
are two separate victims. 
Second,... It would appear that the Utah State Legislature did not intend 
the multiple crimes of felony murder to be punished as a single crime, but rather, 
that the homicide be enhanced to second degree felony murder in addition to the 
underlying felony. To conclude otherwise would be to defeat the deterrent 
purpose of the felony murder statute and result in unjust consequences. 
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McCovev. 803 P.2d at 1238-39. McCovev is factually distinguished from the present 
case and it was wrongly decided. 
In the present case, the victim of the Aggravated Burglary and the victim of the 
murder is the same person. Donald Dobson, the murder victim, lived in the burglarized 
home. R: 463 [115-17]. The State alleged in the Second Amended Information that 
Dobson was shot in his dwelling during a burglary. R: 19. The jury was instructed that 
Mr. Pierson was charged with burglarizing the dwelling of Dobson. R: 296. Further, 
unlike McCovev. Mr. Pierson did not shoot Dobson. Hartley did. R: 340; 469[68]. Mr. 
Pierson was charged as a party to the homicide because he was alleged to have 
participated in the Aggravated Burglary with Hartley. See Instruction No. 25. R: 326. 
Second, the McCovev court improperly resorted to legislative intent in order to 
override the plain language in § 76-l-402(3)(a). McCovev, 803 P.2d at 1239-40 
(Durham, J., dissenting; Zimmerman, J., dissenting). Justice Durham wrote in dissent: 
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion overrides the plain language in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a). This court has previously stated, "Where 
statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond to 
divine legislative intent. Instead, we are guided by the rule that a statute should be 
construed according to its plain language." Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 
134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988). The plain language of section 76-1-
402(3)(a) indicates that if an offense "is established by proof of the same or less 
than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged" the 
defendant may not be convicted of both the offense and an offense so included. It 
is not possible to convict a defendant of killing while commiting an aggravated 
robbery without proving the facts of the felony of aggravated robbery. The 
United States Supreme Court reached a similar result in Whalen v. United States, 
445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980). "A conviction for killing 
in the course of a rape cannot be had without proving all the elements of the 
offense of rape." Whalen. 445 U.S. at 693-94, 100 S.Ct. At 1438-39. 
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Id. at 1239. 
Third, Aggravated Burglary is an enhancing factor in felony murder under §76-5-
203(I)(d) (1997), in the present case. As such, it is functionally equivalent to the facts in 
Shaffer, where Aggravated Robbery served as an enhancing factor in first degree murder 
under § 76-5-203)(l)(d) (1988). McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1238. And, the present case is 
clearly factually distinguished from McCovey. In the present case, unlike McCovey, Mr. 
Pierson is convicted for murder, for a shooting that he did not commit (R: 340; 469[68]) 
because it occurred during an Aggravated Burglary that constitutes a necessary element 
of felony Murder. Also, unlike McCovey, the victim of the homicide is also the victim of 
the burglary in the present case. Viewing Aggravated Burglary as an included offense, 
therefore, does not result in "a two-for-one windfall" for Mr. Pierson. Id. at 1239. 
For these reasons the Court should vacate Mr. Pierson's conviction of Aggravated 
Burglary in Count II pursuant to the provisions of § 76-l-402(3)(a), Utah Code Ann. 
(1998); Shaffer, 775 P.2d at 1314. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS COUNT III. 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPING. 
To determine whether Aggravated Kidnaping is an included offense of 
Aggravated Burglary, we compare the statutory elements of the crimes charged in the 
present case. Hill 674 P.2d at 97. The jury was instructed by Instruction No. 27 that the 
following statutory elements must be proven for Aggravated Burglary in Count II: 
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1. That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the defendant, Michael Paul Pierson, entered or remained in the 
building of Jared Bowers: and 
2. That the defendant entered or remained unlawfully; and 
3. That the defendant entered or remained intentionally or knowingly; and 
4. That the defendant entered or remained with the intent to commit a 
theft; and 
5. That in attempting, committing or fleeing from a burglary, the defendant 
or another participant in the crime either: 
(a) caused bodily injury to any person who was not a participant in 
the crime; or 
(b) used or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous weapon 
against any person who is not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possessed or attempted to use any explosive or dangerous 
weapon. 
R: 328 (emphasis added).2 The jury was instructed by Instruction No. 32 that the 
following statutory elements must be proven for Aggravated Kidnaping in Count III: 
1. That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the defendant, Michael Paul Pierson, did by any means and in any 
manner, seize, confine, detain, or transport Neyna Davis; and 
2. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation was done 
intentionally or knowingly; and 
3. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation was against 
the will of Neyna Davis, and without authority of law; and 
4. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation was 
committed with the intent to hold Neyna Davis as a shield or for ransom or 
reward; or to hold Neyna Davis as a shield or hostage; or to facilitate the 
commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or attempted 
commission of a felony; or to inflict bodily injury to Neyna Davis. 
R: 334. See also Instructions Nos. 1 (R: 296), and 33 (R: 336). 
A. Aggravated Kidnaping Is An Included Offense Of Aggravated Burglary. 
2. See supra Footnote 1. 
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Examination of these statutory elements suggests that a greater-lesser relationship 
does not necessarily exist as a theoretical matter. Therefore, it is necessary to consider 
the evidence to determine whether the greater-lesser relationship exists between the 
specific variations of Aggravated Burglary and Aggravated Kidnaping proven at trial. 
Hill. 674 P.2d at 97. 
The jury was instructed to multiple variations of Aggravated Kidnaping, even 
though the evidence at trial supported only a detention with the commission of a felony, 
Aggravated Burglary. See § 76-5-302(1 )(b)(ii), Utah Code Ann. (1998). The evidence 
of Aggravated Kidnaping consisted of the following: (1) A single male took Neyna 
Davis from the livingroom to two rooms in the basement of the same house (R: 464[66-
79]; 468[262]); (2) The detention lasted several minutes (R: 464[78-79]; 468[262]; (3) 
Clint Hartley testified that he took the girl to the basement (R: 468[261]); (4) Melisa 
Parker testified that Mr. Pierson took the girl downstairs (R: 467[ 143-44]); and (5) The 
purpose of the detention was to find the marijuana (R: 464[72]; 468[261]). 
The evidence of Aggravated Burglary consisted of the following: (1) The 
defendants entered or remained unlawfully in the house (R: 468[257]); (2) With the 
intent to steal marijuana (R: 468[238]); and (3) While doing so Donald Dobson was shot 
by Hartley (R: 340; 469[68]) and (4) Neyna Davis, and others, was threatened with a gun 
(R:464[71]). 
This evidence shows that the Aggravated Kidnaping and the Aggravated Burglary 
occurred simultaneously. Thus, the elements of Aggravated Kidnaping were established 
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by the same or less facts establishing the Aggravated Burglary. In State v. Finlayson, 
956 P.2d 283, 289 (Utah App. 1998), the Court of Appeals of Utah adopted a three-part 
test to determine whether a detention or movement of a victim is significantly 
independent of another crime to justify a separate conviction for Kidnaping consistent 
with the provisions of § 76-l-402(3)(a): 
[I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the 
commission of another crime, to be kidnaping the resulting movement or 
confinement: 
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other 
crime; 
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and 
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it 
makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially 
lessons the risk of detection. 
A standstill robbery on the street is not a kidnaping; the forced removal of the 
victim to a dark alley for robbery is. The removal of a rape victim from room to 
room within a dwelling solely for the convenience and comfort of the rapist is not 
a kidnaping; the removal from a public place to a place of seclusion is. The 
forced direction of a store clerk to cross the store to open a cash register is not a 
kidnaping; locking him in a cooler to facilitate escape is. 
(Citations omitted) (emphasis added). Applying this test, the detention of Davis was 
brief, lasting perhaps two to three minutes. The movement to another room in the same 
house is inconsequential. Davis lived in the house being burglarized. R: 463 [117]. 
Aggravated Burglary, as instructed, requires the use of a dangerous weapon against a 
person, and a detention is therefore inherent to the burglary charge. Also, the detention 
did not have any significance independent of the burglary because it neither made the 
burglary substantially easier to commit, nor substantially lessened the risk of detection 
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because the purpose of the detention was to accomplish the burglary by finding the 
marijuana. R: 468[237]. In Finlayson, the Court held that a separate conviction of 
Aggravated Kidnaping was not supported by the evidence where the defendant 
handcuffed the victim, carried her into another room in the same house against her will, 
and then raped her. This reasoning is controlling in the present case. 
For these reasons the Court should vacate Mr. Pierson's conviction of Aggravated 
Kidnaping in Count III because it is an included offense of Aggravated Burglary 
pursuant to the provisions of § 76-l-402(3)(a), Utah Code Ann. (1998); Finlayson, 956 
P.2d at 290. 
B. Aggravated Kidnaping Merges Into Aggravated Burglary. 
Recently the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the decision in Finlayson, but on 
different grounds. State v. Finlayson, No. 980279 (Utah January 14, 2000) ("Finlayson 
IT). The opinion remains subject to revision before final publication. Finlayson II held 
that Aggravated Kidnaping did not constitute an included offense of Rape and Sodomy 
according to § 76-l-402(3)(a) because Rape and Sodomy do not require proof of 
detention, an essential element of Aggravated Kidnaping, although detention is 
inherently an aspect of both crimes. Id., slip op at 5. The court reasoned that §76-1-
402(3)(a) does not govern because, in the language of the statute, Aggravated Kidnaping 
is not "established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense" of Rape and Sodomy. Id. Finlayson II further held, 
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however, that the conviction of Aggravated Kidnaping must be vacated because the 
detention was slight, inconsequential, merely incidental to the other crimes and had no 
independent significance. Id., slip. op. at 9. 
The reasoning in Finlayson II applies in the present case and requires that the 
conviction of Aggravated Kidnaping be vacated. Finlayson II adopted the same three-
part analysis relied on by the Court of Appeals in analyzing the Aggravated Kidnaping 
charge: 
[I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the 
commission of another crime, to be kidnaping the resulting movement or 
confinement: 
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the 
other crime; 
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; 
and 
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in 
that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or 
substantially lessons the risk of detection. 
Id., slip. op. at 8 (citing State v. Buggs, 547 P.2d 720, 731 (Kan. 1976)); see also State 
v. Finlayson. 956 P.2d 283, 289 (Utah App. 1998). As already discussed, supra at H.A., 
the detention of Davis was brief, lasting perhaps two to three minutes. The movement to 
another room in the same house is inconsequential. Davis lived in the house being 
burglarized. R: 463 [117]. Aggravated Burglary, as instructed, requires the use of a 
dangerous weapon against a person, and a detention is therefore inherent to the burglary. 
Also, the detention did not have any significance independent of the burglary because it 
neither made the burglary substantially easier to commit, nor substantially lessened the 
risk of detection because the purpose of the detention was to accomplish the burglary by 
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finding the marijuana. R: 468[238]. For these reasons the Court should vacated Mr. 
Pierson's conviction of Aggravated Kidnaping in Count III based on the doctrine of 
merger. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY WITH 
THE LAW BARRING CONVICTION FOR INCLUDED AND MERGED OFFENSES. 
Section 76-1-402(3), provides in part that a "defendant may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense." In the present case, Mr. Pierson was convicted on all 
Counts, although Count II, Aggravated Burglary, is an included offense of Count I, 
Murder, and Count III, Aggravated Kidnaping is an included offense of Count II, 
Aggravated Burglary (or, merges into Count II) and, a fortiori, of Count I as well. The 
trial court failed to instruct the jury according to § 76-1-402(3), and failed to instruct the 
jury according to the doctrine of merger,3 and trial counsel failed to request that these 
Instructions be given. 
3. As discussed, supra at II.B., Finlayson II, No. 980279, slip. op. at 8, held that an 
accused cannot be convicted both for a charged offense and for another offense that 
merges into it, even where § 76-l-402(3)(a) does not technically apply. A jury 
Instruction should have been given similar to the following based on the doctrine of 
merger. (See Rule 19(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1998)): 
Mr. Pierson is charged with Criminal Homicide, Murder in Count I, with 
Aggravated Burglary in Count II, and with Aggravated Kidnaping in Count III. If 
a movement or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the 
commission of another crime, you cannot convict Mr. Pierson of the offense of 
Aggravated Kidnaping unless you find the following to be true beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
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Further, the court instructed the jury with Instruction No. 23 which provides: 
A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of the information. 
Each charge and the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately. 
The fact that you may find the accused guilty or not as to one of the offenses 
charged should not control your verdict as to any other offense charged. 
R: 324. Instruction No. 23 is an incorrect statement of law in view of the provisions of § 
76-1-402(3), the doctrine of merger and the greater-lesser relationships of Counts I, II 
and III. Trial counsel failed to object to Instruction No. 23. 
A. The Jury Instructions Create Manifest Injustice. 
Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1998), provides as follows: 
Rule 19. Instructions 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly 
the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a 
party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid a 
manifest injustice. 
FN. 3 (Continued) 
(a) The movement or confinement was not slight, inconsequential 
and merely incidental to the other crime; 
(b) The movement or confinement was not of the kind inherent in 
the nature of the other crime; and 
(c) The movement or confinement had some significance 
independent of the other crime in that it made the other crime substantially 
easier of commission or it substantially lessened the risk of detection. 
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Because trial counsel failed to object to Instruction No. 23, and also failed to request 
Instructions based on § 76-1-402(3) and the doctrine of merger, error may be assigned to 
the Instructions only on a showing of manifest injustice. Utah courts have adopted a 
two-part test to determine whether manifest injustice exists. First, the error must be 
obvious. Second, the error must be of sufficient magnitude that it affects the substantial 
rights of a party. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998). This is the same 
standard that is applied to determine whether plain error exists under Rule 103(d), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1998). Id. Error is considered to be of sufficient magnitude that it 
affects the substantial rights of a party where there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for the accused in the absence of the error. State v. Labruiru 881 P.2d 
900, 903 (Utah App. 1994). 
First, in the present case, the error in failing to instruct the jury according to § 76-
1-402(3) and the doctrine of merger should have been obvious to the trial court. Trial 
counsel repeatedly argued to the court — not in the presence of the jury — that Mr. 
Pierson could not be convicted of Aggravated Burglary and Aggravated Kidnaping 
because they were included and merged offenses. R: 123-31; 372-84; 461 [25-26]; and 
469[64-66]. Because the jury's function is to convict or not, it is essential that it be 
instructed that it cannot convict according to § 76-1-402(3) and the doctrine of merger if 
the evidence demonstrates the requisite relationships among charges. The error of 
Instruction No. 23 should have been obvious as well because it directly contradicts the 
provisions of § 76-1-402(3) and the doctrine of merger by instructing that "The fact that 
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you may find the accused guilty or not as to one of the offenses charged should not 
control your verdict as to any other offense charged." 
Second, these errors affected the substantial rights of Mr. Pierson because there is 
a reasonable likelihood that the jury would not have convicted him of Aggravated 
Burglary and Aggravated Kidnaping because the evidence at trial supports the argument 
that Counts II and III are merged offenses or included offenses according to § 76-1-
402(3)(a). 
For these reasons this Court should vacate the convictions under Count II, 
Aggravated Burglary, and Count III, Aggravated Kidnaping. State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 
1059, 1061 (Utah 1991). 
B. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective. 
Trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to request jury instructions according 
to § 76-1-402(3)(a) and the doctrine of merger, and when he failed to object to 
Instruction No. 23. Utah courts have adopted a two-part test to evaluate claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. First, a defendant must show that his counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. at 688. Second, defendant must demonstrate that but for the 
specifically identified acts or omissions of counsel, there would exist a reasonable 
probability ofa more favorable result. Id. at 694; State v. Saunders. 893 P.2d 584. 591 
(Utah App. 1995). A "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine 
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confidence in the outcome. Id. 
In the present case, the failure of trial counsel to request jury instructions 
according to § 76-1 -402(3)(a) and the doctrine of merger, and his failure to object to 
Instruction No. 23 falls below an objective standard of competence. First, no 
explanation or tactical reason exists for such a decision. Therefore, the first part of the 
Strickland test is satisfied. See State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990). 
Second, where jury instructions create manifest injustice or plain error, the first part of 
the Strickland test is satisfied where trial counsel makes no attempt to cure the error. See 
State v. Labrum. 881 P.2d at 906-07. 
It is also clear in the present case that the second part of the Strickland test is 
satisfied. Objecting to Instruction No. 23 and requesting instructions according to § 76-
1-402(3)(a) and the doctrine of merger would have precluded defendant's convictions of 
Count II, Aggravated Burglary, and Count III, Aggravated Kidnaping. For these reasons 
this Court should vacate the convictions of Count II and Count III. 
IV. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPOSING MAXIMUM 
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES. 
A sentencing court must determine whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for separate felony offenses arising out of a single criminal episode. See §§ 
76-1-401, 76-3-401 (1), (5), Utah Code Ann. (1998). For this determination, the court 
must consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, 
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant, See § 76-3-401 (1); State v. StrunL 846 P.2d 
1297, 1301 (Utah 1993). If a statute under which the defendant was convicted - i.e., § 
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76-5-302, Utah Code Ann. (1998), Aggravated Kidnaping - mandates that one of three 
stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the term of 
middle severity unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
See § 76-3-20l(6)(a), Utah Code Ann. (1998). In this determination, the court may 
consider the record in the case, reports submitted for sentencing, statements submitted by 
the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing 
hearing. See § 76-3-20l(6)(c). The court is required to consider the sentencing 
guidelines adopted by the Utah Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. See § 76-
3-201(6)(e); Appendix D, Utah Code of Judicial Administration (1999). The court must 
set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing the upper or lower 
term. § 76-3-20 l-(6)(d). An abuse of discretion occurs at sentencing when the court 
fails to consider all the legally relevant factors or if the sentence imposed is clearly 
excessive. State v. McCovev, 803 P.2d at 1235. 
The court sentenced Mr. Pierson as follows: on Count I, Murder, five years to life 
imprisonment; on Count II, Aggravated Burglary, five years to life imprisonment; and on 
Count III, Aggravated Kidnaping, fifteen years to life imprisonment. The court ordered 
that each sentence be consecutive. The court also imposed a maximum consecutive 
sentence enhancement of one to five years on each Count under § 76-3-203(1), Utah 
Code Ann. (1998) ("gun enhancement"). R: 413-14. The court did not impose sentence 
enhancements under § 76-3-20.1,'Utah Code Ann. (1998) ("gang enhancement"), 
believing that it could not legally do so. R: 461 [43]. By this sentence Mr. Pierson is 
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required to serve a mandatory minimum term of twenty-eight years imprisonment before 
being eligible for parole. See § 76-3-40l(8)(b). The court stated that it intended to 
impose the maximum possible sentence allowed by law. R: 461 [47]. 
The court made no written findings relating to the sentencing. The court stated as 
follows: 
The - the factors that I've looked at, Mr. Pierson, are the - you were the 
person who planned this, you were the person who set this into motion, who made 
the phone calls, who came up with this plan, who got the group together to go to 
the house. 
You were one of the two individuals who fired a gun at Mr. Dobson. The 
fact that is may have been Mr. Hartley's bullet in no way diminishes your 
culpability, because you were prepared to shoot someone if necessary and you 
took a gun with you, a loaded gun with you into that home. 
You were the moving force behind this. If you hadn't put this plan into 
motion and called your friends together to do this, this killing wouldn't have taken 
place. 
I have considered that. I have also considered the fact that this was a very 
violent, unprovoked, planned killing. You fully intended to kill somebody if you 
had to, to achieve your unlawful objective. 
You don't have the longest criminal history that I've ever seen, but you 
have a troublesome one in terms of the offenses that you've had, both in juvenile 
and adult court before this. 
I think it is clear to everyone in this courtroom today also that this killing 
has devastated an entire family and I'm speaking of Mr. Dobson's family. And -
and again I'm quoting what someone else said, but they'll never be the same 
again, their lives will never be the same and it is because you chose to engage in 
this activity that their lives will never be the same again. 
And finally, I see no remorse on your part. I think you're sorry you got 
caught, I don't think you're sorry for anything else, however. 
I'm imposed the maximum sentence that I believe I can impose consistent 
with my interpretation of State law and I think that's appropriate for your activity 
in these crimes. 
I will note that my recollection is that Mr. Hartley also go the maximum 
penalty that could have been imposed for the offenses that were before me at that 
time, and so in terms of the same kinds of thoughts, I believe that I was consistent 
in your sentencing with Mr. Hartley's. It was my intent then to give him the 
maximum and my recollection is that I did. I only make that comment because 
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counsel asked for some parity and I think that it's there. 
Those are the factors that I reviewed and Counsel, will you please tell me if 
there's anything that I have overlooked. 
R: 461 [46-48]. 
A. The Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Consider Legally Relevant Factors. 
The court abused its discretion by relying on aggravating circumstances that are 
implicit to the conviction offenses, by relying on aggravating circumstances that are 
based on erroneous factual findings, by failing to consider Mr. Pierson's youth and 
rehabilitative needs as mitigating circumstances, and by departing from the median 
mandatory term of imprisonment without factual findings. In so doing the court imposed 
a sentence that is clearly excessive. See State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244 (Utah 1995). 
The court relied at sentencing on a Presentence Report ("PSR") and on personal 
letters received on behalf of Mr. Pierson and Donald Dobson. R:453; 461 [2]. A copy 
of the PSR is attached as Addendum D. The PSR listed the following Aggravated 
Circumstances that may justify concurrent or consecutive sentencing: Offender presents a 
serious threat of violent behavior; Victim was particularly vulnerable; Injury to person or 
property loss was unusually extensive; Offense was characterized by extreme cruelty or 
depravity; and There were multiple charges or victims. R: 453[PSR at Form 5]. 
According to the sentencing guidelines it is incorrect to utilize these allegations as 
Aggravated Circumstances because they are implicit in the conviction of offenses. See 
PSR Form 5. There is no evidence that the victims art particularly vulnerable. See, e.g.. 
State v. Strunk (Victim was six-year-old neighbor girl who knew and trusted the 
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defendant). The death of Donald Dobson is implicit to the conviction offense of Murder, 
and therefore not an aggravating circumstance of the crime. Similarly, there is 
insufficient evidence of extreme cruelty or depravity that is not merely implicit to the 
conviction offenses (e.g., torture, lengthy detention, deliberate physical injury to victims). 
For this reason the court abused its discretion when it relied on these circumstances to 
justify consecutive sentencing, maximum sentencing under § 76-3-203(1) ("gun 
enhancement") and maximum mandatory minimum sentencing under § 76-5-302(3) 
(Aggravated Kidnaping). 
Second, the court erroneously stated that the killing of Dobson was planned, that 
Mr. Pierson "fired a gun at Mr. Dobson" and "it may have been Mr. Hartley's bullet" that 
killed Dobson: R: 461 [46-47] (emphasis added). The court abused its discretion when it 
relied on facts not proven to impose consecutive sentences, maximum sentences under § 
76-3-203(1) and maximum mandatory minimum sentencing under § 76-5-302(3). See, 
e.g., Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah App. 1991) ("the 
making of a clearly erroneous factual finding is an abuse of discretion"). There is no 
evidence that the killing of Dobson was planned. R: 468 [249]. The State did not charge 
the homicide as an intentional crime, and the prosecution repeatedly argued that it was 
not. R: 326[41]; 463[100]; 466[160]. There is no evidence that Mr. Pierson fired a gun 
at Mr. Dobson (R: 463[131]; 464[63], and the evidence is indisputable that Hartley, not 
Mr. Pierson, shot Dobson. R: 340. In fact, the court failed to consider these facts as 
mitigating circumstances of Mr. Pierson's alleged role in these crimes. In State v. Galll 
-33-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998), The Supreme Court of Utah held that the trial courts 
abused their discretion when they sentenced defendant consecutively and failed to give 
adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances, including that defendant did not 
inflict physical injury on his victims and that the amount of money taken during the 
armed robberies was relatively small. Mr. Pierson is not alleged to have taken anything 
in this burglary, and there is no evidence that he injured the victims. 
Third, the court abused its discretion by failing to take into account Mr. Pierson's 
youth and rehabilitative needs as mitigating factors. On January 27, 1997, the date of the 
offenses, Mr. Pierson was nineteen years old. R: 453[PSR at 1-2]. The court noted that 
Mr. Pierson does not have an extensive prior criminal history R: 461 [47]. In State v. 
Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court of Utah held that failure to 
consider the sixteen-year-old defendant's age as a mitigating factor at sentencing 
required remand to the trial court for resentencing. The defendant had been convicted of 
capital Murder, Child Kidnaping and Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child after he 
abducted a six-year-old neighbor girl, drove her to a remote location, sexually abused her 
and then killed her by repeated beatings and strangulations. The defendant was 
sentenced to five years to life imprisonment for Murder, fifteen years to life for Child 
Kidnaping and nine years to life for Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child. All three 
sentences were ordered to run consecutively. The court wrote: 
By ordering Strunk's minimum sentences for child kidnapping (fifteen 
years) and aggravated sexual assault of a child (nine years) to run consecutive to 
each other, the trial court assured that Strunk would spend a minimum of twenty-
four years in prison before being eligible for parole. While imprisonment for that 
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period of time, or even longer, may prove to be necessary and appropriate, the 
twenty-four-year term robs the Board of Pardons of any flexibility to parole 
Strunk sooner. Section 76-3-401 requires a trial court, in determining whether to 
order consecutive sentences, to consider not only the "gravity and circumstances 
of the offense," but also the "rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Although 
under the statute a court may impose consecutive sentences for separate offenses 
committed in the course of a single criminal episode, we find that in this case the 
trial court abused its discretion in failing to sufficiently consider defendant's 
rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme youth and the absence of prior violent 
crimes. 
Therefore, if on remand the trial court again imposes the longest minimum 
mandatory terms for these two offenses, all three terms should be ordered to run 
concurrently to afford the Board of Pardons the flexibility to adjust Strunk's 
prison stay to match his progress in rehabilitation and preparation to return to 
society. 
Id. at 1301-02. This reasoning should apply in the present case. 
The court received information from various sources that Mr. Pierson was raised 
in a dysfunctional home, was abandoned at age two by his mother, suffered from 
Attention Deficit Disorder as a child, received psychological counseling as a child and 
dropped out of school in the ninth grade. R: 453[PSR at 13-14, 17; letters of Michael 
Pierson (father), Monica D. Pierson, Delora Pierson and Paula S. Pierson]. These 
circumstances clearly demonstrate extraordinary rehabilitative needs. The Galli court 
recognized that consecutive sentencing is contrary to rehabilitation: 
The imposition of concurrent rather than consecutive sentences better 
serves Galli's rehabilitative needs by allowing the Board of Pardons and parole to 
release him from prison after five years if he has shown genuine progress toward 
rehabilitation. If he does not show such progress, then the Board will be able to 
keep him incarcerated for a long time, including life. 
967 P.2d at 938. The Strunk court ruled similarly. 846 P.2d at 1302 ("The diagnostic 
report was not optimistic as to Strunk's prospect for long-term rehabilitation, but only 
-35-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
time will tell what progress this youth can make toward overcoming his serious 
problems."). This reasoning should apply in the present case. 
Finally, the PSR recommended that Mr. Pierson receive the median term often 
years to life for the convictions of Aggravated Kidnaping, and further that the 
convictions of Aggravated Burglary and Aggravated Kidnaping be sentenced 
concurrently with each other but consecutively to the conviction of Murder. R: 453 [PSR 
"Agency Recommendation"]. The court is required to impose the median term of 
severity - for Aggravated Kidnaping, ten years to life imprisonment - unless it sets forth 
on the record facts supporting and reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. See § 
76-3-20l(6)(a); State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113, 1121 (Utah App. 1995). In the present 
case the court relied on no facts or reasons in addition to those set forth in the PSR to 
justify the upward departure from the recommended ten-year mandatory minimum term. 
Further, the court made no findings specific to departure from the statutory presumption 
of the term of middle severity. Failure to identify and weigh aggravating and mitigating 
factors under §76-3-201 (6)(a), (d) constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Gibbons, 
799P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1989). 
For these reasons this Court should vacate the consecutive sentences, the 
enhancements of maximum severity under § 76-3-203(1) and the maximum mandatory 
minimum term under § 76-5-302(3) and remand the case to the trial court for 
resentencing to concurrent terms with enhancements and mandatory minimum terms of 
lesser severity. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons this Court should vacate the conviction of Count 
II, Aggravated Burglary because it constitutes an included offense of Count I, Criminal 
Homicide, Murder according to § 76-1-402(3)(a). This Court should vacate the 
conviction of Count III, Aggravated Kidnaping, because it constitutes a lesser offense of 
Count II, Aggravated Burglary according to § 76-1-402(3)(a) and also according to the 
doctrine of merger. This Court should vacate the convictions of Count II and Count III 
because the jury instructions were erroneous. And finally, this Court should remand the 
case for resentencing to concurrent terms of imprisonment with enhancements and 
mandatory minimum terms of lesser severity. 
SUBMITTED this ft day of February, 2000. 
ROGER K. SCOWCRpFT^ 
Attorney for Defendant7Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, ROGER K. SCOWCROFT, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered 
eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 
400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and two copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, 
Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this p day of February, 2000. 
y^< 
ROGER K. SCOWCROE 
DELIVERED this <P day of February, 2000. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL PAUL PIERSON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 971004133 FS 
Judge: SANDRA PEULER 
Date: June 18, 1999 
PRESENT 
Clerk: kathyg 
Prosecutor: VINCENT MEISTER 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): PATRICK L ANDERSON 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 2, 1977 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 11:17 
CHARGES 
1. MURDER - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/28/1998 Guilty Plea 
2. AGGRAVATED BURGLARY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/28/1998 Guilty Plea 
3. AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING" - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/28/1998 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant'& conviction of MURDER a 1st Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than five years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate tern 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison, 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING a 1st 
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Case Mo: 971004133 
Date: Jun 18, 1999 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than fifteen years and which may be life in the Utah 
State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Each sentence is to be consecutive. 
GUN ENHANCEMENT: Consecutive 1 - 5 years on each Count. 
Dated this ifo day of Jl(Al£ 19^4 . 
SANDRA PEULER 
District Court Judge 
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ADDENDUM B 
(Rules and Statutes) 
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Rule 19. Instructions. 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as tne court 
reasonably directs, any party may file written request that the'court instruct 
the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such 
requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel 
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy 
of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions 
may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court 
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part 
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of 
the charge was given and what part was refused. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. 
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instruc-
tions in order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court 
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the 
exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon 
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court 
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Rule 103. Rulings on evidence* 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection 
or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, 
if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance 
of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the 
context within which questions were asked. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further 
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making 
of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being sug-
gested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof 
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court. 
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76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — Joinder 
of offenses and defendants. 
In this part unless the context requires a different defini-
tion, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which is 
closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the 
effect of Section 77-8a-l in controlling the joinder of offenses 
and defendants in criminal proceedings. 
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76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single crimi-
nal episode — Included offenses. 
( D A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal 
action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a 
single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provi-
sion; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such 
provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision, 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses uii-
der a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise 
orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to 
separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single 
court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney 
at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in 
the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the 
offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so 
included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all 
the facts required to establish the commission of the 
offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or 
form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an 
offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser 
included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with 
respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis 
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged 
and convicting him of the included offense.. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, 
or an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine 
that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviption for 
the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for an included offense and
 fthe trier of 
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that 
included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be 
set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for 
the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such 
relief is sought by the defendant. 
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76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences al-
lowed — Civil penalties — Restitution — 
Hearing — Definitions. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the 
defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for 
which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentenc-
ing court with or without an admission of committing the 
criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, 
but not general damages, which a person could recover 
against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the 
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal ac-
tivities and includes the money equivalent of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses 
including earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal pay-
ment for pecuniary damages to a victim, including the 
accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured 
damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental 
entity for extradition or transportation and as further 
defined in Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court de-
termines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result 
of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in 
the defendant's criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may 
sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the 
following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private 
office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided 
by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without 
parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority 
conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity 
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition 
to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall 
order that the defendant make restitution to victims 
of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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for which the defendant has agreed to make restitu-
tion as part of a plea agreement. For purposes of 
restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in 
Subsection (l)(e). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropri-
ate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures 
as provided in Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitu-
tion, the clerk of the court shall enter an order of 
complete restitution as defined in Subsection (8Kb) on 
the civil judgment docket and provide notice of the 
order to the parties. 
, (iv) The order is considered a legal judgment en-
forceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and the person in whose favor the restitution order is 
entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In addition, the Department of Correc-
tions may, on behalf of the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for 
payment of restitution and the victim or department 
elects to pursue collection of the order by civil process, 
the victim shall be entitled to recover reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a 
hen when recorded in a judgment docket and shall 
have the same effect and is subject to the same rules 
as a judgment for money in a civil action. Interest 
shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of 
sentencing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make 
rules permitting the restitution payments to be cred-
ited to principal first and the remainder of payments 
credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state 
under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve 
pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal 
activity in the county to which he has been returned, 
the court may, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, order that the defendant make restitu-
tion for costs expended by any governmental entity 
for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropri-
ate, the court shall consider the criteria in Subsection 
(4Xc). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall deter-
mine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution nec-
essary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by 
the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitu-
tion the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the 
defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Libra y, J. Reuben Clark Law Sch ol, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
/ W — j — Z. U J. ^ \ J U I 1 L U y 
the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered resti-
tution shall be determined as provided in Subsection 
(8). 
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appro-
priate or inappropriate under this subsection, the 
court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of 
the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to 
enforce the judgment, the defendant shall be entitled 
to offset any amounts that have been paid as part of 
court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a 
hen when recorded in a judgment docket and shall 
have the same effect and is subject to the same rules 
as a judgment for money in a civil action. Interest 
shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of 
sentencing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make 
rules permitting the restitution payments to be cred-
ited to principal first and the remainder of payments 
credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, 
or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the 
time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on 
the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may 
impose, the court shall order the defendant to pay resti-
tution of governmental transportation expenses if the 
defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one 
county to another within the state at governmental 
expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C 
misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay 
restitution of governmental transportation expenses if 
any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or 
on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant is issued 
for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to 
a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation ex-
penses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated 
according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is 
transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is 
transported; and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is 
transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection 
(5)(c)(v) applies to each defendant transported regard-
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less of the number of defendants actually transported 
in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was con-
victed mandates that one of three stated minimum terms 
shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the 
term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party 
may submit a statement identifying circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. 
If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed with the 
court and served on the opposing party at least four days 
prior to the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances 
that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the 
court may consider the record in the case, the probation 
officer's report, other reports, including reports received 
under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or 
mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, 
and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing 
hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts 
supporting and reasons for imposing the upper or lower 
term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall 
consider sentencing guidelines regarding aggravation and 
mitigation promulgated by the Commission on Criminal 
and Juvenile Justice. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child 
kidnaping, rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon 
a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the defendant causes 
substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set 
forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the 
defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the 
defendant shall be sentenced to the highest minimum term in 
state prison. This subsection takes precedence over any con-
flicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an 
offense, the offense shall include any criminal conduct 
admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to 
which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of 
an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a 
conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any 
person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal con-
duct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other condi-
tions for complete restitution, the court shall consider all 
relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense 
resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of prop-
erty of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related pro-
fessional services and devices relating to physical, 
psychiatric, and psychological care, including non-
medical care and treatment rendered in accordance 
with amethod of healing recognized by the law of the 
place of treatment; the cost of necessary physical and 
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occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the in-
come lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related ser-
vices if the offense resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other condi-
tions for court-ordered restitution, the court shall con-
sider the factors listed in Subsection (8)0)) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the 
burden that payment of restitution will impose,- with 
regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution 
on an installment basis or on other conditions to be 
fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of 
the payment of restitution and the method of pay-
ment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court deter-
mines make restitution inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may 
defer entering an order of restitution if the court deter-
mines that the complication' and prolongation of the 
sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of 
restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs 
the need to provide restitution to the victim. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of 
imprisonment — Increase of sentence if dan-
gerous weapon used. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term 
at not less than five years, unless otherwise specifically 
provided by law, and which may be for life but if the trier 
of fact finds a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 
76-1-601, was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the per-
son convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively 
and not concurrently; and the court may additionally 
sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a 
term at not less than one year nor more than 15 years but 
if the trier of fact finds a dangerous weapon, as defined in 
Section 76-1-601, was used in the commission or further-
ance of the felony, the court shall additionally sentence 
the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may 
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeter-
minate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively 
and not concurrently. 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term 
not to exceed five years but if the trier of fact finds a 
dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 76-1-601, was 
used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the 
court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to. exceed five years to rim 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment for a felony in which a dangerous weapon, 
as defined in Section 76-1-601, was used or involved in the 
accomplishment of the felony and is convicted of another 
felony when a dangerous weapon was used or involved in 
the accomplishment of the felony shall, in addition to any 
other sentence imposed, be sentenced for an indetermi-
nate term to be not less than five nor more than ten years 
to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
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76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — 
Limitations — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been ad-
judged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to 
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the 
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses 
run consecutively if the later offense is committed while the 
defendant is imprisoned or on parole unless the court finds 
and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be 
inappropriate. 
(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state 
whether the sentences shall run consecutively or concurrently, 
and the Board of Pardons and Parole has reason to believe 
that the later offense occurred while the person was impris-
oned or on parole for the earlier offense, the board shall 
request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the 
request, the court shall enter an amended order of commit-
ment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively 
or concurrently. 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of 
the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose 
consecutive sentences. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode as defined in Section 
76-1-401. 
(6) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate 
maximum of all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years 
imprisonment. However, this limitation does not apply if an 
offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the 
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one 
offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more 
offenses, all of which were committed prior to imposition 
of sentence for any one or more of them; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state 
other than the present sentencing court or by a court of 
another state or federal jurisdiction. 
(8) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and 
the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has 
been committed for a single term that shall consist of the 
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year 
limitation, the maximum sentence is considered to be 30 
years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, 
the minimum term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the 
validly imposed minimum terms. 
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(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to 
run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently 
f>eing served, the lesser sentence shall merge into the greater 
and the greater shall be the term to be served. If the sentences 
are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one sentence 
with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be 
served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the 
niunber or length of individual consecutive sentences that 
may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so 
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the author-
ity of a court to impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor 
cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned* means sentenced 
and committed to a secure correctional facility as defined in 
Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated or 
voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where 
the person is located. 
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76-5-203, Murdei 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the acton 
(a) intentionally or knowincdv causes the death of an-
other 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another 
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that 
causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life engages in conduct which 
creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of another; 
(d) while in the commission, attempted commission, or 
immediate flight from the commission or attempted com-
mission of aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, object rape, 
forcible sodomy, or aggravated sexual assault, aggravated 
arson, arson, aggravated burglary, burglary, aggravated 
kidnapping, kidnapping, child kidnapping, rape of a child, 
object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, forcible sexual 
abuse, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of 
a child, or child abuse, as defined in Subsection 76-5-
109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 14 years of age, 
causes the death of another person other than a party as 
defined in Section 76-2-202; or 
(e) recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while 
in the commission or attempted commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer as defined in 
Section 76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making 
a lawful arrest as defined in Section 76-8-305 if the 
actor uses force against a peace officer. 
(2) Murder is a first degree felony. 
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76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping. 
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the person 
intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law and 
against the will of the victim, by any means and in any 
manner, seizes, confines, detains, or transports the victim: 
(a) and in committing, attempting to commit, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of the 
kidnaping, the actor possesses, uses, or threatens to use a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) with intent: 
(i) to hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or 
hostage, or to compel a third person to engage in 
particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in 
particular conduct; 
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted com-
mission, or flight after commission or attempted 
commission of a felony; 
(iii) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the 
victim or another, 
(iv) to interfere with the performance of any gov-
ernmental or political function; or 
(v) to commit a sexual offense as described in Part 
4 of this chapter. 
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the result of force, 
threat, or deceit if the victim is mentally incompetent or 
younger than 16 years and the detention or moving is accom-
plished without the effective consent of the victim's custodial 
parent, guardian, or person acting in loco parentis to the 
victim. 
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a first degree felony punish-
able by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less 
than 6, 10, or 15 years and which may be for life. Imprison-
ment is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-406. 
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76-6-203. Aggravated burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempt-
ing, committing, or fleeing from a burglary the actor or 
another participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily iiyury to any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous 
weapon against any person who is not a participant in the 
crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dan-
gerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the 
same definition as under Section 76-1-601. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL PAUL PIERSON, 
Defendant. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CRIMINAL NO. 971004133 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant MICHAEL PAUL PIERSON 
is charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the 
commission of CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER: AGGRAVATED BURGLARY; and 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING . The Information alleges: 
COUNT I 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER, a First Degree Felony, at 6543 West 
3880 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about January 
27, 1997, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL 
PAUL PIERSON, a party to the offense, while in the commission, 
attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or 
attempted commission of aggravated burglary, caused the death of 
Donald Dobson. 
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COUNT II 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a First Degree Felony, at 6543 West 3880 
South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about January 27, 
1997, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 203, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL PAUL 
PIERSON, a party to the offense, entered or remained unlawfully in 
the dwelling of Donald Dobson with the intent to commit a felony, 
and caused bodily injury to Donald Dobson and/or entered or 
remained unlawfully in the dwelling of Donald Dobson with the 
intent to commit a felony, and used a dangerous weapon, to wit: 
handgun, against Donald Dobson. 
COUNT III 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 6543 West 
3880 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about January 
27, 1997, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 302, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL 
PAUL PIERSON, a party to the offense, did intentionally or 
knowingly, and without authority of law, and against the will of 
Neyna Davis, seize another with the intent to compel a third person 
to engage in a certain act or forbear from engaging in a certain 
act and/or did intentionally or knowingly, and without authority of 
law, and against the will of Neyna Davis, seize another with the 
intent to facilitate the commission or attempted commission of a 
felony, or flight from a felony. 
*\ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. <^\ 
It becomes my duty as judge to instruct you concerning the law 
applicable to this case, and it is your duty as jurors to follow 
the law as I shall state it to you. 
The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that are 
presented by the allegations in the Information and the defendant's 
plea of "not guilty." This duty you should perform uninfluenced by 
pity for the defendant or by passion or prejudice against the 
defendant. You must not suffer yourselves to be biased against the 
defendant because of the fact that defendant has been arrested for 
this offense, or because an Information has been filed against 
defendant, or because defendant has been brought before the court 
to stand trial. None of these facts is evidence of defendant's 
guilt, and you are not permitted to infer or to speculate from any 
or all of them that defendant is more likely to be guilty than 
innocent. 
You are to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in 
this trial and the law as stated to you by me. The law forbids you 
to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, 
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. Both the State of 
Utah and the defendant have a right to demand and expect that you 
will conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
evidence and apply the law of the case, and that you will reach a 
just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such verdict 
may be. The verdict must express the individual opinion of each 
juror. 
i«i 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
In determining any fact in this case you should not consider 
nor be influenced by any statement or act done by the court which 
you may interpret as indicating its views thereon. You are the 
sole and final judges of all questions of fact submitted to you, 
and you must determine such questions for yourselves from the 
evidence, without regard to what you believe the court thinks 
thereon. The court has not intended to express, or be understood 
as giving any opinion on what the proof shows or does not show, or 
what are or what are not the facts in the case. It is immaterial 
what the court thinks thereon. You must follow your own views and 
not be influenced by the view of the court. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. H 
You should not consider as evidence any statement of counsel 
made during the trial, unless such statement was made as a 
stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or facts. 
~ ~l 
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INSTRUCTION NO. J 
If in these instructions any rule, direction or idea has been 
stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none 
must be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single 
out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction, 
but you are to consider the instructions as a whole, and to regard 
each in the light of all the others. 
The order in which the instructions are given has no 
significance as to their relative importance. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of their 
deliberations are a matter of considerable importance. It is 
rarely productive of good for a juror, upon entering the jury room, 
to make an emphatic expression of their opinion on the case or to 
announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When one 
does that at the outset, their sense of pride may be aroused, and 
they may hesitate to recede from an announced position even if 
shown that it is fallacious. Remember that you are not partisans 
or advocates in this matter, but are judges. The final test of the 
quality of your service will lie in the verdict which you return to 
the court not in the opinions any of you may hold as you retire to 
begin your deliberations. Have in mind that you will make a 
definite contribution to efficient judicial administration if you 
arrive at a just and proper verdict. To that end, the court would 
remind you that in your deliberations in the jury room there can be 
no triumph excepting the ascertainment and declaration of the truth 
and the administration of justice based thereon. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ' 
The State of Utah and the defendant both are entitled to the 
individual opinion of each juror. It is the duty of each of you 
after considering all the evidence in. the case, to determine, if 
possible, the question of guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
When you have reached a conclusion in that respect you should not 
change it merely because one or more of all of your fellow jurors 
may have come to a different conclusion. However, the jurors 
should freely and fairly discuss the evidence and the deductions to 
be drawn therefrom. If, after doing so, any juror should be 
satisfied that a conclusion first reached was wrong, the juror 
unhesitatingly should abandon that original opinion and render the 
jurorfs verdict according to the final decision. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
At times throughout the trial the court has been called upon 
to determine whether certain offered evidence might properly be 
received. You are not to be concerned with the reasons for such 
rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them. Whether 
offered evidence is admissible is purely a question of law. In 
admitting evidence to which an objection is made, the court does 
not determine what weight should be given such evidence; nor does 
it pass on the credibility of the witness. You are not to consider 
evidence offered but not received, nor any evidence stricken out by 
the court; as to any question to which an objection was sustained, 
you must not conjecture as to what the answer might have been or as 
to the reason for the objection. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor 
of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until proved 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In case of a reasonable doubt as 
to whether defendant's guilt is satisfactorily shown, defendant is 
entitled to an acquittal. 
The burden is upon the State to prove the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The State's evidence must eliminate all 
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, however, does 
not require proof to an absolute certainty. 
A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and women 
would have, and it must arise from the evidence or the lack of 
evidence in the case. Depending upon the circumstances, 
possibilities may create a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, 
reasonable doubt cannot be a doubt that is merely fanciful or 
imaginary, or is based upon wholly speculative possibilities. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which 
satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those who are 
bound to act conscientiously upon it, and eliminates all reasonable 
doubt. A determination that a defendant has committed a crime 
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beyond a reasonable doubt demands the application of reason, 
impartiality and common sense. 
^trtL 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1^ 
A person charged with a crime is presumed to be innocent until 
he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption of 
innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded by the jury at 
pleasure but is a substantial, essential part of the law and is 
binding upon a jury. This presumption is a humane provision of the 
law, intended, so far as human agency is capable, to guard against 
the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished. 
The presumption of innocence must continue to prevail in the 
minds of the jury unless and until the jury is satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, and, in case of a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, he is entitled to an 
acquittal. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1 1 
Where there is a conflict in the evidence you should reconcile 
such conflict as far as you reasonably can. But where the conflict 
cannot be reconciled, you are the final judges and must determine 
from the evidence what the facts are. There are no definite rules 
governing how you shall determine the weight or convincing force of 
any evidence, or how you shall determine what the facts are in this 
case. But you should carefully and conscientiously consider and 
compare all of the testimony, and all of the facts and 
circumstances, which have a bearing on any issue, and determine 
therefrom what the facts are. You are not bound to believe all 
that the witnesses have testified to or any witness or class of 
witnesses unless such testimony is reasonable and convincing in 
view of all the facts and circumstances in evidence. You may 
believe one witness as against many, or many as against fewer 
number in accordance with your honest convictions. The testimony 
of a witness known to nave made false statements on one matter is 
naturally less convincing on other matters, so if you believe a 
witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material fact in 
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this case, you may disregard the whole of the testimony of such 
witness, or you may give it such weight as you think it is 
entitled. 
n.r%q 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of 
the testimony and credibility of the witnesses you have a right to 
take into consideration their bias, their interest in the result of 
the suit, or any probable motive or lack thereof to testify fairly, 
if any is shown. You may consider the witnesses1 deportment upon 
the witness stand, the reasonableness of their statements, their 
apparent frankness or candor, or the want of it, their opportunity 
to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to 
remember. You should consider these matters together with all of 
the other facts and circumstances which you may believe have 
bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' 
statement. 
/ i » n 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
The testimony of some witnesses may be considered with 
caution. 
For example, a witness who hopes to gain more favorable 
treatment in his or her own case may have a reason to make a false 
statement because he or she wants to strike a good bargain with the 
government. 
So, while a witness of that kind may be entirely truthful when 
testifying, you may consider that testimony with caution. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. | H^ 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinion 
of a witness to be received as evidence. An exception to this 
rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. A person who by 
education, study, and experience has become an expert in any art, 
science or profession, and who is called as a witness, may give 
an opinion as to any such matter in which the witness is 
qualified as an expert and which is material to the case. You 
should consider such expert opinion and should weigh the reasons, 
if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such 
opinion. You should give it the weight to which you deem it 
entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may reject it 
if, in your judgment, the reasons given for it are unsound. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. \^ 
An important question in this case is the identification of 
the defendant as the person who committed the crime. The 
prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, 
not only that the crime was committed, but also that the 
defendant was the person who committed the crime. If, after 
considering the evidence you have heard from both sides, you are 
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the 
person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant not 
guilty. 
The identification testimony that you have heard was an 
expression of belief or impression by the witness. To find the 
defendant not guilty, you need not believe that the 
identification witness was not insincere, but merely that the 
witness was mistaken in his or her belief or impression. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In 
considering whether the prosecution has proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed 
the crime, you should consider the following: 
1. Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe 
the criminal actor? In answering this question, you should 
consider: 
(a) the length of time the witness observed the actor; 
(b) the distance between the witness and the actor; 
(c) the light or lack of light at the place and time 
of observation 
(d) the presence or absence of distracting noises or 
activity during the observation; 
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(e) any other circumstance affecting the opportunity 
of the witness to observe the person committing 
the crime. 
2. Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person 
committing the crime? In answering this question, you should 
consider whether the capacity of the witness was impaired by: 
(a) stress or fright at the time of observation; 
(b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices; 
(c) fatigue or injury. 
3. Whether the witness is of a different race than the 
criminal actor. Identification by a person of a different race 
may be less reliable than identification by a person of the same 
race. 
4. Was the identification of the defendant by the witness 
completely the product of the witness' own memory? In answering 
this question, you should consider: 
(a) the length of time that passed between the 
original observation of the witness and the 
identification of the defendant by the witness; 
(b) the mental capacity and state of mind of the 
witness at the time of the identification: 
(c) the exposure of the witness to opinions, to 
photographs, or to any other information or 
influence that may have affected the independence 
of the identification of the defendant by the 
witness; 
(d) any instance when the witness failed to identify 
the defendant; 
(e) any instances when the witness gave a description 
of the actor that is inconsistent with the 
defendant's appearance; 
(f) the circumstances under which the defendant was 
presented to the witness for identification. 
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You may also take into account that identifications made from 
seeing the person are generally more reliable than identifications 
made from a photograph. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. / 
You are instructed that the defendant is a competent witness 
in his/her own behalf and has the right to go upon the witness 
stand and testify if defendant chooses to do so. However, the law 
expressly provides that no presumption adverse to defendant is to 
arise from the mere fact that defendant does not take the witness 
stand. If defendant is satisfied with the evidence which has been 
given, there is no occasion for defendant to add thereto. 
So, in this case the mere fact that this defendant has not 
testified should not prejudice defendant in any way. It should not 
be considered as any indication either of defendant's guilt or 
innocence. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INSTRUCTION NO. | H 
Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in courts 
of justice, upon either or both of which, juries lawfully may base 
their findings, whether favorable to the State or to the defendant, 
provided, however, that to support a verdict of guilt, the 
evidence, whether of one kind or the other or a combination of 
both, must carry the convincing quality required by law. 
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other as 
circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between the two 
classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to 
their effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each for 
such convincing force as it may carry and accepts each as a 
reasonable method of proof. 
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at the time in question 
is the testimony of every witness who, with any of their own 
physical senses, perceived such conduct or any part thereof, and 
which testimony describes or relates what thus was perceived. All 
other evidence admitted in the trial is circumstantial in relation 
to such conduct, and, insofar as it shows any act, statement or 
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other conduct, or any circumstance of fact, tending to prove by 
reasonable inference the innocence or guilt of the defendant, it 
may be considered by you in arriving at a verdict. 
aic 
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INSTRUCTION NO. I Q 
To constitute the crime charged in the information there 
must be the joint operation of two essential elements: conduct 
prohibited by law and the appropriate culpable mental state or 
states with regard to the conduct prohibited by law. 
Before a defendant may be found guilty of a crime, the 
evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was prohibited from committing the conduct charged in the 
information and that the defendant committed such conduct with 
the culpable mental state required for such offense. 
"Conduct" means an act or omission. 
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
"Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty 
to act and the actor is capable of acting. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. V \ 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of the offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense 
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of mind 
and connotes a purpose in so acting. Intent, being a state of 
mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive 
evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, 
statements and circumstances. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. <3, \ 
Intent and motive should never be confused. Motive is what 
prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to 
the state of mind with which an act is done or omitted. 
Motive is not an element of any offense, and hence need not 
be proven. The motive of an accused is immaterial except insofar 
as evidence of motive may aid in your determination of state of 
mind or intent. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. c3£k 
Although there is more than one person who is named in this 
action, the case against each person is separate from and 
independent of the case of the other. In this action the only 
defendant on trial is Michael Pierson. 
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A separate crime or offense 
information. Each charge and 
should be considered separately, 
accused guilty or not guilty as 
should not control your verdict c 
NO. 33 
is charged in each count of the 
the evidence pertaining to it 
The fact that you may find the 
to one of the offenses charged 
s to any other offense charged. 
*% » 
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INSTRUCTION NO. A 4 
Before you can convict the defendant, Michael Paul Pierson, 
of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder as charged in Count 
I of the Information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following 
elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah; 
2. The defendant, Michael Paul Pierson, as a party to the 
offense; 
3. Was engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or 
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of 
aggravated burglary; and 
4. Unlawfully caused the death of Donald Dobson. 
If the evidence establishes each of the foregoing elements, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of 
Criminal Homicide, Murder as charged in Count I of the 
Information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, 
then you must find the defendant not guilty of Count I. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INSTRUCTION NO. d ^ 
The defendant will have caused the death of another if the 
death is caused by anyone while this defendant, either directly 
or as a party to the offfense, engages in the commission, 
attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or 
attempted commission of aggravated burglary. 
The State need not prove that any party to the aggravated 
burglary intended to kill another. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. Qi^p 
"On or about" includes any day that closely approximates or 
is near the day alleged in the information. 
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Before you can convict the defendant, Michael Paul Pierson, 
of the offense of Aggravated Burglary as charged in count II of 
the information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following 
elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Michael Paul 
Pierson, entered or remained in the building of Jared Bowers; 
and 
2. That the defendant entered or remained unlawfully; and 
3. That the defendant entered or remained intentionally 
or knowingly; and 
4. That the defendant entered or remained with the intent 
to commit a theft; and 
5. That in attempting, committing or fleeing from a 
burglary, the defendant or another participant in the crime 
either: 
(a) caused bodily injury to any person who was 
not a participant in the crime; or 
(b) used or threatened the immediate use of a 
dangerous weapon against any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; or 
(c) possessed or attempted to use any explosive 
or dangerous weapon. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
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of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Burglary as charged 
in count II of the information. If, on the other hand, you are 
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of 
the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not 
guilty of count II. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ^ Q 
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person is guilty of 
Burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any 
portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
A person is guilty of Aggravated Burglary if in attempting, 
committing, or fleeing from a burglary the actor or another 
participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous 
weapon against any person who is not a participant in the crime; 
or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or 
dangerous weapon. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. Q L ^ 
A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon the 
premises when the premises or any portion thereof at the time of 
the entry or remaining are not open to the public and when the 
actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain 
on the premises or such portion thereof. 
"Building," in addition to it ordinary meaning, means any 
watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure 
or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for 
carrying on business therein and includes: 
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the 
structure or vehicle; and 
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the 
structure or vehicle. 
"Enter" means intrusion of any part of the body or 
intrusion of any physical object under the control of the actor. 
"Unlawful or unlawfully" means that which is contrary to 
law or unauthorized by law, or, without legal justification, or, 
illegal. 
A "Participant" is a person who could be charged as a party 
to the crime and does not include the victim of the crime or the 
person against whom the crime is committed. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3 ^ 
When a person unlawfully enters a building with the intent 
to commit a theft, the crime of burglary is committed and 
successful completion of the intended theft need not be shown. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that a firearm is a dangerous weapon. 
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Before you can convict the defendant, Michael Paul Pierson, 
of the offense of Aggravated Kidnapping as charged in count III 
of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following 
elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Michael Paul 
Pierson, did by any means and in any manner, seize, confine, 
detain, or transport Neyna Davis; and 
2. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or 
transportation was done intentionally or knowingly; and 
3. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or 
transportation was against the will of Neyna Davis, and without 
authority of law; and 
4. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or 
transportation was committed with the intent to hold Neyna Davis 
for ransom or reward; or to hold Neyna Davis as a shield or 
hostage; or to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, 
or flight after commission or attempted commission of a felony; 
or to inflict bodily injury to Neyna Davis. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Kidnapping as 
charged in count III of the information. If, on the other hand, 
you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or 
** -> > 
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more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant 
not guilty of count III. 
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Under the law of the State of Utah, a person commits 
Aggravated Kidnapping if that person intentionally or knowingly, 
without authority of law and against the will of the victim, by 
any means and in any manner seizes, confines, detains, or 
transports the victim with intent: 
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or 
hostage, or to compel a third person to engage in particular 
conduct or to forbear from engaging in particular conduct; or 
(b) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or 
flight after commission or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim 
or another. 
« *9 
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A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent 
or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, 
with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is 
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the 
result. 
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INSTRUCTION NO . 3T 
You are instructed that Aggravated burglary is a felony. 
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The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after 
the commission of a crime or after that person is accused of a 
crime that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to 
establish the defendant's guilt. However, such flight, if 
proved, may be considered by you in light of all other proven 
facts in the case in determining guilt or innocence. 
Although consciousness of guilt may be inferred from flight, 
it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime 
charged, and there may be reasons for flight fully consistent 
with innocence. Therefore, whether or not evidence of flight 
shows a consciousness of guilt and the significance, if any, to 
be attached to any such evidence are matters exclusively within 
the province of the jury. 
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You are instructed that the parties have stipulated and agreed, and you must accept as true 
facts each and all of the following: 
1. Police recovered the guns alleged to have been involved in this case in a pond. 
2. Jeff Burgener showed the police where the guns were. 
3. The two recovered guns were cut up by Jeff Burgener and Benny Gardner. 
4. The guns were taken to the State Crime Laboratory for testing. 
5. Testing revealed that the 9mm casing found at the scene of the crime was fired 
from the pistol alleged to have been used by Michael Pierson. 
6. Bullet fragments found in the wound path of Donald Dobson were comparable to 
being fired from a revolver alleged to have been used by Clint Hartley. 
7. The 9mm pistol alleged to have been used by Michael Pierson was excluded as 
having fired the bullet fragments recovered in the wound path. 
8. The 9mm pistol allegedly used by Jeff Burgener was excluded as having fired the 
bullet fragments recovered in the wound path. 
> • . i i 
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In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss 
nor consider the subject of penalty or punishment, as that is a 
matter which lies with the Court and other governmental agencies, 
and must not in any way affect your decision as to the guilt or 
innocence of a defendant. 
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When you retire to consider your verdicts, you will select one 
of your members to act as foreperson, who, as foreperson, will 
preside over your deliberations. 
Your verdicts in this case must be either: 
Guilty of CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER, a First Degree Felony, as 
charged in Count I of the Information; 
or 
Not Guilty of Count I, CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER, a First 
Degree Felony; 
And/or 
Guilty of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a First Degree Felony, as 
charged in Count II of the Information; 
or 
Not Guilty of Count II, AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a First Degree 
Felony; 
And/or 
Guilty of AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, as 
charged in Count III of the Information; 
or 
Not Guilty of Count III, AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree 
Felony; 
as your deliberations may determine. 
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all 
jurors is required to find a verdict. Your verdicts must be in 
writing, and when found, must be signed and dated by your 
foreperson and then returned by you to this court. When your 
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verdicts have been found, notify the bailiff that you are ready to 
report to the court. 
+%Ji -* 
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PRIVATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
REGION III OFFICE 
451 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 239-2103 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
Date Due: 09-30-98 
Sentencing Date: 10-05-98 
JUDGE SANDRA PEULER THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE SALT LAKE UTAH 
(CITY) (COUNTY) 
C. TODD ORGILL CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR 
NAME: PIERSON, MICHAEL PAUL 
ALIASES: MIKE PIERSON 
ADDRESS: SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL 
SLC, UTAH 84111 
BIRTHDATE: 06-02-77 AGE: 21 
BIRTHPLACE: TUCSON, AZ 
LEGAL RESIDENCE: UTAH 
MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE 
COURT CASE NO: 971004133 
OBSCIS NO: 00131400 
CO-DEFENDANTS: CLINT R. HARTLEY; 
JEFFERY RAY BURGENER; MELISA PARKER 
OFFENSE: CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, FIRST 
DEGREE FELONY; AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, 
FIRST DEGREE FELONY; AGGRAVATED 
KIDNAPPING, FIRST DEGREE FELONY W/ GANG 
AND FIREARM ENHANCEMENTS 
PLEA: CONVICTED DATE: 08-28-98 
PROS. ATTORNEY: VINCE MEISTER 
DEF. ATTORNEY: PATRICK ANDERSON 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
PIERSON, MICHAEL PAUL 
PLEA BARGAIN: 
The defendant was originally charged with Count One, Criminal Homicide, Murder, First Degree 
Felony; Count Two, Aggravated Burglar}7, First Degree Felony; and Count Three, Aggravated 
Kidnapping, First Degree Felony. All of these charges were subject to enhanced firearms and 
gang penalties because the offenses were committed with a firearm, and in concert with two or 
more people. On August 28, 1998, the defendant was convicted as charged via a jury trial. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Court dockets and District Attorney file 
OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: 
On 1/27/97, at 1950 hours, West Valley City Police Department Officer Vanroosendaal arrived 
at 6515 West 3880 South at 2000 hours. At that moment, he saw several people standing in the 
road. One male ran toward his patrol car, yelling, "You've got to help me, help him!" 
Officer Vanroosendaal then asked where the victim was. The male pointed to 6543 West 3880 
South. Officer Vanroosendaal then asked where were the suspects. Several people yelled, 
"They're gone. They left in a white car." This was done as Officer Vanroosendaal was running 
toward 6543 West 3880 South, the victim's location. 
Officer Vanroosendaal ran through the yard and into the driveway of 6543 West 3880 South and 
gave dispatch his exact location. Officer Vanroosendaal entered the residence through the west 
door. He walked through the kitchen and then left into the living room (north). Lying on the 
ground was a white male (later identified as Donald Dobson) in a brownish shirt. The male was 
lying on his back, head pointed north, feet pointed south. The white male's eyes were closed and 
there was a large puddle of blood on the sides of and underneath his head. There was a large 
wound on the right side of the white male's head with bone and brain matter visible. There was 
also brain material underneath and on the left side of the victim's head. The victim was gurgling 
but breathing short quick breaths. Officer Vanroosendaal checked the carotid pulse of the victim. 
It was present but not regular or strong. Officer Vanroosendaal continued to monitor the victim's 
respiration and pulse, yelling to him to hang on. 
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OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE. (Continued) 
There were several people in the living room sitting on the black leather sofa on the north wall 
and a couple were standing. Officer Vanroosendaal asked that anyone "who didn't need to be 
there" leave. He also noticed blood on the north wall of the living room, the north door in the 
living room and on the black leather sofa that people had been sitting on. 
Medical began to arrive at about 2005 hours. Officer Vanroosendaal assisted as Officer Monson 
also assisted and took pictures of the scene. Medical requested Life Flight. Officer 
Vanroosendaal then advised dispatch to call for Life Flight and set up a landing zone with 
another officer as soon as possible. 
After medical left the scene, Officer Vanroosendaal began looking for bullet casings or bullets. 
He found a bullet, copper in color, with two silver fragments near it by the north wall of the 
kitchen. Officer Vanroosendaal also observed blood on the same wall above the paneling. He 
then observed blood on the north stairway wall. Officer Vanroosendaal covered the bullet 
fragments and bullet with glasses and a pitcher from the floor of the kitchen. He then waited for 
evidence detectives to arrive. Upon their arrival, he left the house. 
Officer Vanroosendaal then spoke to Jarred Bowers, a witness. Jarred stated that approximately 
10 minutes prior to his arrival, he was in the kitchen of 6543 West 3880 South with several 
friends and the victim, Donald Wayne Dobson. Donald was the white male gunshot victim 
found at 6543 West 3880 South. Jarred stated that someone knocked on the west door of the 
residence. Jarred answered the door. A 16-18 year old female, approximately 5'0", blonde hair 
in a ponytail with a black sweater and light colored Levi's asked, "Is Nick here?" Immediately 
after her question, Jarred stated that a white male with a black hat, pulled down to cover his face, 
a black bandana tied around his face from his nose down, a black Atlanta Falcons T-shirt jersey 
#21 (Deion Sanders) with red and white trim and Levi's, entered the doorway from the north and 
put a gun to Jarred's head. Jarred believed the gun to be a black semi-auto type. As the male 
suspect was putting the gun to Jarred's head, Jarred pushed the male suspect's arm away. A shot 
went off near Jarred's head. As Jarred pushed the suspect's arm, the suspect went backwards. 
Jarred then ran out of the house over the white female and into three males walking up the 
driveway. The three males were wearing black and red bandanas covering the lower half of their 
faces. The three males attempted to stop Jarred with their hands and arms. Jarred put his arms 
up and ran through them to his friend's house on 6515 West at about 3885 South, and called the 
police. As Jarred was running, he heard at least two gunshots. 
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OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: (Continued) 
At approximately 2330 hours, Officer Vanroosendaal was contacted by Mr. Scott Dobson, the 
victim's father. Scott advised that his son, Donald, had died at LDS Hospital. Officer 
Vanroosendaal then referred the case to Detective Bob Day who arrived on the scene and 
continued the investigation. 
Detective Day began interviewing witnesses, who identified the possible suspect as Nathan 
Curtis Hicks and David Alexander. Witnesses stated these suspects had an "an ongoing feud 
with the victim." Detective Day spoke to Nathan Hicks, who stated he was not involved in the 
robbery or murder, but suspected a person named "P-Dog," later identified as Michael Pierson, 
was responsible. Nathan Hicks stated he was home at the time of the robbery and learned of the 
shooting when the helicopter landed on their street. Detective Day then interviewed David 
Alexander, who also denied any involvement in the offense and stated he was home with his 
family when the robbery occurred. 
On 1/29/97, Detective Day received an anonymous phone call from a confidential informant who 
stated two hours prior to the shooting, he received a phone call from Michael Pierson. Mr. 
Pierson is a member of the "Kearns Town Bloods" and the C.I. stated Pierson and the KTB had 
been involved in several drug related robberies during the past year. The C.I. told Detective Day 
that during his phone call with Michael Pierson on the night of the shooting, Mr. Pierson said he 
was going to "jack" or rob, the victim and send a female to the door first. Mr. Pierson told him, 
"I'm grabbing the first mother-fucker at the door. If he gets crazy, I'll kill him." The 
conversation also included some reference to the victim having "scored some drugs." The C.I. 
advised that after the incident, he received a phone call from David Alexander, who had learned 
about the shooting from Jeremy Brinkerhoff, a neighbor who lived near the victim. The C.I. told 
Detective Day he knew Pierson and a second party known s "K-Dog," later identified as Clint 
Hartley, arrived at the home of "Pokey," or Klynt Barber, after the shooting and asked him to 
drive them away from the area. The C.I. stated a person named "Skelly," later identified as 
Jeffrey Burgener, drove a white Eagle Talon, the same style of car as the suspect car. The C.I. 
advised Michael Pierson had a girlfriend named Jennifer Elliott. 
Detective Day interviewed Ms. Elliott, who advised Michael Pierson told her he had gone to a 
"place to rob someone," a person had come at him and he was shot by one of Mike's friends. 
Mike told Ms. Elliott he was armed, but he did not shoot anyone. Ms. Elliott stated she spoke to 
Mike's sister, Monica Pierson, who told her there was a female involved in the robbery named 
Melisa Parker. 
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OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: (Continued) 
On 2/11/97, Melisa Parker was advised of her Miranda rights. She denied personal culpability 
or knowledge of the crime, and requested an attorney. On 3/5/97, Ms. Parker was re-interviewed 
and admitted to her involvement in the robbery. She provided detectives with important 
information about the circumstances and details of the offense. Ms. Parker related she was 
contacted by Michael Pierson four hours prior to the robbery, advising her of the plan, and 
requesting her assistance. Pierson told her the target had 40 pounds of marijuana and she would 
receive 10 pounds for her services. Ms. Parker stated she, Michael Pierson, Jeff Burgener, and 
Clint Hartley rehearsed the plan before committing the robbery. Ms. Parker recalled she heard 
two shots fired and then went into the house and saw the victim laying on the floor. She stated 
Michael Pierson told her the following day he and Clint Hartley fired at the same time. Ms. 
Parker was released after the interview. 
On 2/6/97, Detective Vince Garcia received a phone call from Michael Pierson, who asked if he 
could come in and talk with detectives about the case. He told Detective Garcia he had heard the 
police were looking for him. Mr. Pierson arrived at the station and an interview was conducted. 
Mr. Pierson was advised of his Miranda rights. He denied personal culpability or knowledge of 
the robbery and said David Alexander and Nathan Hicks were likely responsible for the crime. 
Mr. Pierson related he had been involved with "drug rip-offs" several years ago, but had not 
engaged in that behavior for some time. Mr. Pierson claimed the information alleging his 
involvement in the robbery was a mistake. He said, "You don't have a gun, fingerprints, or GSR, 
so we don't have a case." 
On 2/12/97, Detectives Day and Garcia interviewed Clint Hartley. He was offered his Miranda 
regarding the case. Clint Hartley denied knowing Michael Pierson. He denied any knowledge or 
involvement in the robbery. Detective Day asked Clint Hartley if he would submit to a 
polygraph test. Mr. Hartley became visibly nervous, his face twitched, and his voice cracked. 
The interview was concluded. It is noted that Mr. Hartley, on 1/23/98, during a Preliminary 
Hearing, fully confessed his involvement in the offense and provided important information 
leading to the resolution of the case. 
It was later determined Parker, Burgener, Hartley, and Pierson, entered the house with the intent 
to commit a theft. Burgener, Hartley, and Pierson, were each in possession of a handgun that 
was displayed at the time of the entry into the house. Upon entry, defendants Pierson and 
Hartley both fired their hand guns. The victim, Donald Dobson was struck once in the head by 
what was later determined to be a 9mm caliber bullet. 
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OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: (Continued) 
After Dobson was shot, defendant Pierson put his hand gun to the head of Neyna Davis and 
escorted her to the basement of the house, demanding that she tell him where all the drugs in the 
house were located. 
On 3/7/97, Detective Day screened the case with the District Attorney's Office. On 3/10/97, 
warrants were issued for the arrests of Michael Pierson, Ray Burgener, Clint Hartley, and Melisa 
Parker. On 3/11/97, all suspects were arrested and booked into the Salt Lake County Jail. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
West Valley City Police Department report #97-004946. 
DEFENDANT'S VERSION OF OFFENSE: 
On Monday, September 21, 1998, this investigator interviewed the defendant at the Salt Lake 
County Jail. At the time of the interview, it was noted the defendant did not receive a 
presentence investigation packet, and as a result, did not have the opportunity to submit his 
version of the current crime. Mr. Pierson was advised this investigator would return on Monday, 
September 28, 1998, to obtain his written statement. Upon returning to the Salt Lake County Jail 
on September 28,1998, the defendant stated he had not completed his version of the crime 
because he believed sentencing was going to be continued to an unspecified date. As a result, the 
defendant's version pertaining to the current crime was not available. 
It must be noted that Mr. Pierson verbally denied being involved in any aspect of the current 
crime. Mr. Pierson surmised the murder was committed by Nathan Hicks and David Alexander. 
He denied ever being present during the commitment of any homicide, and stated he has not been 
involved in a home invasion robbery for at least 4 years. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
CO-DEFENDANT STATUS: 
Clint Hartley, was originally charged with Murder, a First Degree Felony, and Aggravated 
Burglary, a First Degree Felony (971004134). Through plea negotiations, Mr. Hartley pled 
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CO-DEFENDANT STATUS: (continued) 
guilty to amended charges of Criminal Homicide, a Second Degree Felony, to include both gun 
and gang enhancements, and Burglary, a Second Degree Felony on April 23, 1998. On July 23, 
1998, Mr. Hartley was sentenced to the Utah State Prison. Count One, Manslaughter, Second 
Degree Felony, was to run consecutive with the gang enhancement, firearm enhancement, and 
Count Two, Burglary, Second Degree Felony. Mr. Hartley was ordered to pay a $2,500 fine, 
$4,000 restitution jointly and severally, and pay a $500 recoupment fee. 
Jeffrey Ray Burgener was originally charged with Murder, First Degree Felony and Aggravated 
Burglary, First Degree Felony (971004135). A jury trial is scheduled for December 8, 1998, 
before Your Honor. S G W N V ^ *V 1A 
Melisa Parker was originally charged with Murder, First Degree Felony and Aggravated 
Burglary, First Degree Felony (971004132). A review hearing is scheduled for September 30, 
1998. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Court dockets and District Attorney file 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT: 
Debora Latner, Donald Dobson's mother, returned the Victim Impact Statement. She wrote, 
"My son was murdered." Ms. Latner indicated the impact of the crime has been devastating to 
her family and they continue to experience all the emotions associated with the grieving process. 
In regards to restitution, she indicated, "I do not want to be reimbursed for anything. No amount 
of money will help me and I do not want to profit from my son's death." Ms. Latner agreed with 
the outcome of the case and wrote regarding the co-defendant, "Clint Hartley has been very 
cooperative during the past year, but he could still get the same as the other murderers life with 
no parole." With regards to sentencing, Ms. Latner wrote, "I would like to see life with no 
parole- for my son's life they gets no second chance. Why should they? They have to pay for 
their mistakes and may never be able to live among anyone." 
This investigator subsequently contacted Ms. Latner by telephone. She advised this investigator 
that since her son was murdered, she is "afraid of young kids", and is skeptical of everyone. She 
acknowledged she "still cries a lot", and continues to grieve everyday. At the time of his death, 
Ms. Latner stated her son had just turned 21 years of age. Ms. Latner advised this investigator 
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VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT: (continued) 
she believes the defendant should receive the maximum sentence permitted by law. 
Contact was made with Scott Dobson, the victim's father, who stated the tragic loss of his son's 
life has been devastating for him and his family. He related his family has always been close and 
this has been an extremely difficult situation for them. Family members continue to experience 
difficulties with their grief and the loss of a loved one, especially under such tragic 
circumstances. Mr. Dobson said, "An innocent man's life was taken too soon, and for no 
reason." During the course of the Court hearings, Mr. Dobson stated the defendant was very 
snide, and expressed absolutely no remorse. Further, Mr. Dobson stated one of the defendant's 
cohorts threatened his (Dobson's) nephew. With regards to sentencing, Mr. Dobson 
recommended the defendant and co-defendants be committed to prison, without the possibility of 
parole. He considers the defendant and co-defendants to be very dangerous individuals who 
must be kept out of society or else they will kill again. Mr. Dobson asked the Court impose the 
maximum sentence so that there will be no more victims. 
This investigator was unable to establish contact with Neyna Davis or Jarred Bowers prior to the 
date of dictation. The home telephone numbers for Ms. Davis and Mr. Bowers have been 
disconnected. Officials of American Air Duct Cleaning stated Ms. Davis quit approximately 3 to 
4 months ago. 
Joanne Zaharias, LCSW of the District Attorney Victim Counseling Unit, stated she initially met 
with Neyna Davis in April 1997. During this initial meeting, she noted Ms. Davis was having 
flashbacks and was afraid of retaliation. Thereafter, Ms. Zaharias stated Ms. Davis did not 
follow through with ongoing therapy. Ms. Zaharias noted that although she has not had an 
extensive amount of contact with Ms. Davis, she acknowledged Ms. Davis has continued to have 
a struggle maintaining jobs, and a permanent resident. Ms. Zaharias indicated she is not sure if 
her living and employment instability can be attributed to the current case. Ms. Zaharias noted 
her contact with Ms. Davis has been quite superficial. Ms. Zaharias did not have any updated 
information on how Ms. Davis could be contacted. 
Ms. Zaharias stated her only contact with Jarred Bowers has been prior to Court hearings. She 
noted the contact has been quite minimal. Ms. Zaharias did not have any updated information on 
how Mr. Bowers could be contacted. 
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Statements of Debora Latner and Scott Dobson, the victim's parents. 
RESTITUTION: 
COURT CASE # COUNT # VICTIM AMOUNT 
971004133 I (fell Donald Dobson (Funeral Costs, $ 4,000.00 
Crime Victim Reparations) 
971004133 III Neyna Davis Unknown (Unable to 
establish contact) 
971004133 N/A Jarred Bowers Unknown (Unable to 
establish contact) 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Office of Crime Victim Reparation, CVRNo.107147. 
CUSTODY STATUS 
The defendant was booked into the Salt Lake County Jail on March 12, 1997, and has remained 
incarcerated as of the date of dictation. Therefore, as of the October 5,1998, sentencing date, 
Mr. Pierson has served 572 days for the current crime. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Documentation provided by the Salt Lake County Jail 
LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT: 
Detective Bob Day of the West Valley City Police Department stated the defendant is a 
"psychopath." Detective Day stated the current case involving a homicide and home invasion 
robbery was "the tip of the iceberg." Detective Day indicated Mr. Pierson is a "violent, serial 
offender" who is suspected of participating in 60 to 80 home invasion robberies, and being 
present at several other homicides. He acknowledged the defendant is "big-time gang banger" 
who has been active since he was 11 to 12 years old. Since being incarcerated, Detective Day 
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LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT: (continued) 
stated the defendant has been threatening individuals, and "placing contracts" on people's lives 
to deter them from testifying. Detective Day stated the defendant has been extremely 
uncooperative, and has not assumed any culpability for his criminal actions. He indicated Mr. 
Pierson is a "full-time criminal" that is a "sociopath predator." Detective Day stated the 
defendant poses an extreme threat to the general society. He adamantly recommended the 
defendant have all charges and enhancements run consecutively. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Contact with Detective Bob Day of the West Valley City Police Department 
JUVENILE RECORD: 
DATE 
09-16-91 
OFFENSE 
Propelling Object at Vehicle 
DISPOSITION 
Petition filed, dismissed 
Assault Petition filed, dismissed 
02-13-93 Burglary of Vehicle Petition filed, YC Observation & 
Assessment 
Burglary of Vehicle Petition filed, YC Observation & 
Assessment 
Burglary of Vehicle 
Burglary of Vehicle 
Petition filed, dismissed 
Petition filed, YC Observation & 
Assessment 
Theft, $299 or Less, Class 
B Misd. 
Petition filed, dismissed 
Dest. of Property Under $250 Petition filed, dismissed 
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JUVENILE RECORD: (continued) 
DATE 
04-09-93 
08-18-93 
OFFENSE 
Theft, $5,000 or >, Second 
Degree Felony 
Alcohol Poss. / Consumption 
DISPOSITION 
Insufficient facts to justify 
Petition filed, YC Observation & 
Assessment 
10-30-93 
False ID- Name, DOB 
Exhibiting a Dangerous Wpn. 
Petition filed, dismissed 
Review hearing set, YC Observation 
& Assessment 
Shooting in Restricted Area Petition filed, YC Observation & 
Assessment 
11-01-93 
11-15-93 
Detention Hearing 
Review 
Hold in Detention 
Review hearing set, Youth 
Corrections community program, 
attend school, counseling ordered, 
other administrative action 
02-15-94 Review 
Review 
Review hearing set, fined 
Review hearing set, previous order 
continued, other administrative 
action 
05-05-94 Contempt, Non-Pecuniary Crt. 
Order 
Petition filed, previous order 
continued, work hours ordered, other 
administrative action 
05-11-94 Detention Hearing Hold in detention 
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JUVENILE RECORD: (continued) 
DATE 
06-11-94 
06-22-94 
06-24-94 
04-06-95 
08-30-95 
OFFENSE 
Contempt, Non-Pecuniary 
DISPOSITION 
Petition filed, Youth Corrections 
secure facility 
Robbery, Second Degree Felony Petition filed, Youth Corrections 
secure facility 
Detention Hearing 
Parole 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Utah State Juvenile Court records (case no. 816254) 
ADULT RECORD: 
DATE AGENCY 
06-20-96 SO SL Co., UT 
03-12-97 PD WVC, UT 
OFFENSE 
Theft, Misd. 
WA Criminal Homicide; 
WA Agg. Burglary; 
WA Agg. Kidnapping; 
WA Homicide / Art. 
Homicide 
BW Theft; 
BWFTA 
Hold in detention 
Youth Corrections Parole Authority 
Discharged from YC Jurisdiction Discharged 
DISPOSITION 
Convicted, 30 days jail, fined $150 
(963002835, S.L. Co. Justice Court) 
CURRENT OFFENSE 
Pending (See Pending Cases Section) 
Convicted of both offenses on 08-
20-96, $250 fine, 30 days jail, 
counseling with Intermountain 
Substance Abuse (963003263, S.L. 
Co. Justice Court) 
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office rap sheet (SO# 0218360), Utah Criminal History record (SID# 
456268), FBI rap sheet (FBI# 335208EB9), Court dockets, and contact with officials of the Salt 
Lake County Justice Court 
PENDING CASES: 
On August 14, 1997, a case was filed in Third District Court, Salt Lake City, Utah charging the 
defendant with Murder, First Degree Felony and Attempted Murder, Second Degree Felony (See 
03-12-97 arrest date, Court case no. 971015106). A 5 day jury trial is scheduled for November 
2, 1998, before the Honorable Frank Noel. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Court dockets 
PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY: 
The defendant does not possess a history of supervised probation in the state of Utah as an adult. 
Pat Taylor, the defendant's former parole officer, is no longer employed by Youth Corrections. 
As a result, this investigator was unable to obtain any information pertaining to the defendant's 
performance while on Youth Parole. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION. 
Records of the Utah State Department of Corrections and Contact with officials of Youth 
Corrections 
BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: 
Michael Paul Pierson was born in Tucson, Arizona on June 2, 1977. The defendant, and his 
younger sister were raised primarily by their father, as when he was 2 years old, his mother left 
the family. Thereafter, he and his younger sister, were raised primarily by his father and 
grandmother. Per the defendant, he had no contact with his mother during his youth. 
The defendant described his youth as "blessed." Mr. Pierson indicated he "loved" his youth, and 
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BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: (continued) 
his family were very close. In regards to problems, the defendant acknowledged his father was, 
at times, verbally abusive. Mr. Pierson attributed this verbal abuse to the fact his father was 
young, stressed, and did not know how to raise children. According to the defendant, his 
grandmother was essentially a mother figure for him. Mr. Pierson stated during his youth his 
father was employed as an engineer for Bectal Engineering, a mining engineering company. The 
defendant stated his family did not have any problems with drugs or alcohol. 
When the defendant was 11, he, his father, and sister, moved to Reno, Nevada. They remained in 
Reno for 3 years, and then relocated to Elko, Nevada. After living in Elko for 2 years they 
moved to the Salt Lake City area where they have remained for the last 5 years. After the present 
crime occurred, Mr. Pierson stated his father moved to Houston, Texas because of continued 
threats which were being made against them. His father believes Mr. Pierson did not commit the 
current crime. 
Currently, the defendant is incarcerated in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
MARITAL HISTORY: 
The defendant denied ever being married, and did not claim legal or financial responsibility for 
any children. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
EDUCATION: 
The defendant withdrew from Hunter Junior High School located in Magna, Utah during the 
ninth grade. Per the defendant, he withdrew from school prematurely because of a conflict he 
had with his basketball coach. The defendant has not obtained any additional education. He 
expressed a desire to pursue "as much education" as he can in the future. 
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
GANG AFFILIATIONS: 
The defendant is an active member of the King Mafia Disciples. His moniker is "Cocaine." 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Salt Lake City Gang Area Project records 
PHYSICAL HEALTH: 
The defendant described his physical health as "great." Per the defendant, during the latter part 
of 1996, he "blew out" his left knee, and damaged his ACL. Mr. Pierson had surgery performed 
on his knee to repair the damage. He is not ingesting any prescription medication at the current 
time. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
MENTAL HEALTH: 
The defendant stated his emotional health is "good as can be expected." He denied ever being 
referred to a psychologist, psychiatrist, or a mental health facility for emotional problems. He 
has never ingested medications for psychiatric difficulties. The defendant did not express a 
desire to receive mental health counseling at the present time. He has never considered suicide, 
nor has he ever been physically or sexually abused in the past. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
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ALCOHOL HISTORY: 
The defendant initially began using alcohol when he was 17 years old. Mr. Pierson denied ever 
abusing the use of alcohol. He could recall three times in which he has become intoxicated from 
using alcohol. Mr. Pierson stated his use of alcohol is very infrequent. He has never received 
any alcohol abuse treatment, and did not express a desire for such a therapeutic measure at the 
current time. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
DRUG HISTORY: 
The defendant first used marijuana when he was 17 years old. For one year thereafter, he used 
the substance approximately once per week. Since the age of 18, his usage of marijuana has been 
minimal. He denied using any other drugs, and stated he has never received any drug abuse 
treatment. Mr. Pierson did not express a desire to receive drug therapy at the current time. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY: 
The defendant's Social Security Number is 527-97-1245 
The defendant did not provide this investigator with an itemized listing of his previous 
employment experiences. However, he verbally advised this investigator he has primarily been 
employed doing body work, and welding. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
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FINANCIAL SITUATION: 
The defendant is not earning an income at the present time. He has no monthly expenses, debts, 
or assets. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
MILITARY RECORD: 
The defendant has never been a member of the United States Armed Forces. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant 
COLLATERAL CONTACTS. 
Vince Meister, the assigned prosecutor to the current case, recommended all charges and 
enhancements run consecutive for a sentence of 61-Life if the defendant does not cooperate. Mr. 
Meister noted that if Mr. Pierson cooperates on other criminal matters, he receive a sentence of 
either 28-Life or 38-Life. 
Julie Holbrook, LCSW of the District Attorney Victim Counseling Unit, stated the death of 
Donald Dobson has had a devastating effect on his entire family. Ms. Holbrook stated, although 
she has not had ongoing counseling with the family, she stated she has had frequent contact with 
them during Court hearings. Although she did not want to speak on behalf of the family, Ms. 
Holbrook surmised the family wants the defendant and co-defendant's to receive the most severe 
punishment possible. 
Michael Pierson, the defendant's father, verified the information presented in the background, 
marital, education, physical, alcohol, drugs, and military sections of this report. Mr. Pierson 
stated he was forced to leave Salt Lake City after receiving direct threats from Clausing and 
Parker. Per Mr. Pierson, he feared for his and his family's lives. Mr. Pierson stated when the 
defendant was a child, his mother abandoned him. Thereafter, he was diagnosed with Attention 
Deficit Disorder. Mr. Pierson noted his son is "not a murderer", and can be "salvaged." Mr. 
Pierson indicated he may submit a written letter on a future date detailing additional information 
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COLLATERAL CONTACTS: (continued) 
he has regarding the current case. As of the date of dictation, this investigator has not received 
any additional information from Mr. Pierson. 
Patrick Anderson, the defendant's counsel, stated Mr. Pierson has consistently maintained he was 
not involved in the current case. Mr. Anderson noted the bullet which killed Mr. Dobson was 
traced to the gun possessed by Clint Hartley. Further, Mr. Anderson indicated the Kidnapping 
charge should have been merged with the Burglary charge. He noted Neyna Davis was not tied 
up or struck. Mr. Anderson indicated the transporting of Ms. Davis downstairs at gunpoint was 
not a typical, heinous kidnapping offense. Mr. Anderson added that according to the testimony 
of Neyna Davis, it was Clint Hartley that ordered her downstairs at gunpoint, not the defendant. 
Mr. Anderson did not provide this investigator with a specific recommendation pertaining to the 
current crime. 
EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: 
Now appearing before the Court for sentencing on the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder, 
First Degree Felony; Aggravated Burglary, First Degree Felony; and Aggravated Kidnapping, 
First Degree Felony, is Michael Paul Pierson, a 21 year old male. Utah State Juvenile Court 
records revealed the defendant was referred to juvenile authorities 15 times for primarily alcohol, 
burglary, theft, and weapons related charges. As an adult, the defendant has been arrested one 
prior time, and been convicted of 2 theft related misdemeanors. Mr. Pierson was placed in a 
secure facility as a juvenile, and was granted parole one time. Currently, the defendant has a 
pending case out of Third District Court, Salt Lake City, Utah in which he was charged with 
Murder, First Degree Felony and Attempted Murder, Second Degree Felony (See 03-12-97 arrest 
date, Court case no. 971015106). A 5 day jury trial is scheduled for November 2, 1998, before 
the Honorable Frank Noel. 
The family of the victim in this case has suffered extreme trauma, not only over the death of Mr. 
Dobson, but over the brutal and senseless manner of the death. They are requesting the Court 
impose the maximum sentence possible, specifically focusing on their desire no other victims or 
their families suffer from Mr. Piersons conduct. 
The defendant does have family support, but little else to offer in mitigation of his actions. Law 
enforcement personnel describe his as a "serial predator." 
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EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: (continued) 
In this case, Mr. Pierson participated in the most heinous crime one could commit. His actions fatally 
injured Mr. Dobson, and severely threatened others who were present at the residence where the incident 
occurred. Mr. Pierson does not assume any culpability for the current crime, and in fact denied even 
being present. Due to the egregious nature of the present offense, and the very real danger Mr. Pierson 
poses to the general public, this agency absolutely believes the maximum punitive measures should be 
imposed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
C. TODD ORGILL, CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR 
APPROVED, 
LTJIERINE SHEPHERDT 
ASSISTANT REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR 
COURT SERVICES UNIT 
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AGENCY RECOMMENDATION 
It is respectfully recommended by the Staff of Adult Probation and Parole, Court Services, that the 
following sentence be imposed. 
V 
eottense 
five years to life. 
riminal Homicide, Murder, a First Degree Felony, the defendant be committed for 
For the offense of Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony, the defendant be committed for five j ) 
^ears to Ijft^andfor thg^ffense of Aggravated Kidnaping, a First Degree Felony carrying a minimum 
tory tertfTof ^TlOjbr 15 years to lifeline defendant receive the median term of 10 years to life. 
It is further recommended that the offenses of Aggravated Burglary and Aggravated Kidnaping be run 
concurrently with each other, but consecutively with the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder, a First 
Degree Felony. 
It is the understanding that the gang enhancements for each first degree felony are 9 years to life it is 
recommended the gang enhancements for each charge be imposed consecutively, and similarly that the 
apons_^nliancei^ntsj3fU-^vem^ also be impused on cach-eas€4ojQinxonsecutivel5rb The defendant 
should alsobe^5f3ered full restitution, jointly and severally with Mr. Clint HaftT 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
C. TODD ORGILL, CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR 
APPROVED, 
iRINE SHEPHERD, 
ASSISTANT REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR 
COURT SERVICES UNIT 
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CRIMIINAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT ^nosus^ 
?RIOR FELONY CONVICTION 
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL INCIDENTS) 
PRIOR MISD. CONVICTIONS 
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL INCIDENTS) 
(INCLUDES DUI & RECKLESS) 
(EXCLUDES OTHER TRAFFIC) 
'R IOR J U V E N I L E R E F E R R A L S 
(FINDINGS OF DELINQUENT FOR 
INCIDENTS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN 
FELONIES IF COMMITTEO BY AN ADULT) 
[3 NON-STATUS MISD. = 1 FELONY] 
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(ADULT OR JUVENILE) 
<P 4 
6 
8 
V 
4> 
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NONE 
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NONE 
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TWO TO FOUR 
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SECURE PLACEMENT 
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POOR 16-28 
FAIR 
PLEASE CIRCLE THE 
CORRECT CATEGORY 
o NOEBJORSUEEayjSIO 
Cm fTRlOR SUPERyjSJOiP 
"<* HHIUHHkblUENllALPI 
•a 
4 
,, U yjgl N 
*Rl  F 
^ I byiDkNI AL LACEMENT 
PRIOR REVOCATION 
CURRENT SUPERVISION OR PRE-TRIAL RELEASE 
SUPERVISION RISK 
(ADULT OR JUVENILE) 
WEAPONS ENHANCEMENT 
(ACTIVE OFFENSE) 
*OTAL PLACEMENT SCORE: 
2 
3 
4 
0 
2 
NO ESCAPES OR ABSCONDINGS 
FAILURE TO REPORT (ACTIVE OFF.) OR OUTSTANDING WARRANT 
ABSCONDED FROM SUPERVISION 
ABSCONDED FROM RESIDENTIAL PROG. OR EXTRADITION REOt) 
ESCAPED FROM CONFINEMENT 
NONE 
OTHER 
g ) C§KEARg>R EXPLOSIVE 
*• NOTE: 2nd FIREARMS CONVICTION 
REQUIRES A MANDATORY 5-10 YEAR 
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE •* 
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$5,000 
$5,000 
$2,500 
MISDEMEANORS 
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$2,500 
$2,000 
JAIL 
SSU^£HEM $2,000 ; 
\$2,500 "STSSSOO'S $1.500 N 
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CAPITAL 
> 
O POOR 
03 
IME MATRIX 
USED TO CALCULATE MINIMUM TIME IF SENTENCE IS INCARCERATION 
CRIME SEVERITY 
/ T M U m T ) 
12YRS 10YRS 
PERSON CRIMES 
HOMICIDE 2NDDEG 3RDDEG 
2ND SEX 3RD SEX 
6YRS 36MON 24MON 
OTHER CRIMES 
2NDDEG 3RDDEG 
24MON 18 MON 12 MON 
MISDEMEANORS 
A B 
6 MON 
10YRS 7YRS 5YRS 30MON 21 MON 21 MON 15 MON 10 MON 5 MON 
GOOD 
EXCELLED 
4YRS 24 MON 
5YRS 5YRS 3YRS 21 MON 
5YRS 5YRS 2YRS Id MON 
18 MON 
15 MON 
12 MON 
18 MON T2MON 
15 MON 
12 MON 
8 MON 
9 MON 4 MON 
6 MON 3 MON 
4 MON 
3 MON 
3 MON 
r A k i e c r i ITIWC CKILJ A Ui^Cm i tuTt f * 
36 MON 30 MON 24 MON | 18 MON j 12 MON jl2 MON 6MON 3MON 3M0N 
18 MON 
-CONCURRENT ENHANCEMENTS ADDED BY B.O.P. 
15 MON [ 12 MON ( 9 MON j 6 MON j 6 MON j 3 MON 3 MON 3MON 
DRUG DISTRIBUTION OF OR INTENT TO DIST. OVER $500 & RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY SHOULD BE "PERSON" CRIMES 
CONVICTION! ACTIVE 
MOST SERIOUS (JZiMttfA^ fSt>** *c i £>£. 
NEXT MOST SERIOUS /?££„ jCu,*-&. 
OTHER ^ A . /cTftAMPP/V6 
OTHER 
DEGREE YEARS MONTHS £1 
£2L 
TOTAL . 
SENTENCES SHOULD GENERALLY BE CONCURRENT. HOWEVER, THE EXISTENCE 
OF THE FOLLOWING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES SUGGEST CONSIDERATION 
OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: 
1. ESCAPE OR FUGITIVE 
2 UNDER SUPERVISION OR BAIL RELEASE WHEN OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED 
3. UNUSUAL VICTIM VUNERABIUTY 
4 INJURY TO PERSON OR PROPERTY LOSS WAS EXTREME FOR CRIME CATEGORY 
5! OFFENSE CHARACTERIZED BY EXTREME CRUELTY OR DEPRAVITY 
IF THE SENTENCES ARE TO BE CONSECUTIVE, USE THE CONSECUTIVE ENCHANEMENTS 
PORTION OF THE TIME MATRIX' FOR ALL CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES EXCEPT THE 
"MOST SERIOUS" CONVICTION. 
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AGGK^ATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTAlWs 
(Use Form 2 For Mandatory Sentence Situations) 
1'ircle the numbers of circumstances that may justify departure from the 
guidelines. Reference the page number of the presentence investigation where 
:he judge can find supportive information. 
Aggravating Circumstances 
Only use aggravating circumstances if they are not implicit in Che conviction 
offense or the calculation of criminal history score. 
Established instances of repetitive criminal conduct. 
Offender presents a serious threat of violent behavior. 
Victim was particularly vulnerable. 
Injury to person or property loss was unusually extensive. 
Offense was characterized by extreme cruelcy or depravity. 
There were multiple charges or victims. 
Offender'6 attitude is not conducive to supervision in a less 
restrictive setting. 
Offender continued criminal activity subsequent to arrest. 
Sex Offenses: Correction's formal assessment procedures classify 
as an high risk offender. 
Other (specify) 
Mitigating Circumstances 
1. Offender's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened 
serious harm. 
2. Offender acted under strong provocation. 
3. There were substantial grounds to excuse or justify criminal 
behavior, though failing to establish a defense. 
6.. Offender is young. 
5. Offender assisted law enforcement in the resolution of other 
crimes. 
6. Restitution would be severely compromised by incarceration. 
7< Offender's attitude suggests amenability to supervision. 
8. Domestic crime victim does not want incarceration. 
9. Offender has exceptionally good employment and/or family 
relationships. 
10. Imprisonment would entail excessive hardship on offender'or 
dependents. 
11. Offender has extended period of arrest-free street time. 
12. Other (specify) 
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